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Abstract
The subject of this thesis is the efficient deployment of Public Key Infrastructures
(PKI), more specifically, a way to securely and automatically provide and deploy X.509
certificates, using web services as a mean of communication between the Certicate
Authority and end-entities.
This is highly relevant since more and more organizations are using PKI services in
order to, for example, securely communicate through insecure channels like the Inter-
net, digital signing operations or to provide non-repudiation properties to protocols
and information systems.
Although PKI technologies have become pervasive among most institutions, there are
still very few well known protocols that support automatic certificate provisioning;
the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) and the Automatic Certificate
Management Environment (ACME). However SCEP suffers from some security flaws
and ACME is highly focused on a single PKI application domain.
We examined the problem and tried to understand if it is possible to more generally
deploy such an automatic service and to what extent these generalizations can be
considered secure. The thesis begins with a constructive research to analyze existing
solutions, and from the research made, we devise and implement a fully working
solution that we think satisfies our initial goals.
In this thesis we present and describe a fully implementation of an architecture to
deploy such a service. Our system relies on the delivery of security elements, such
as cryptographic tokens or smartcards containing an administrative certificate, to the
PKI end-entities, as a security anchor.
We have also developed a framework architecture for PKI backoffice services, a data
model for end-entity interactions with the backoffice PKI services and a secure Remote
Procedure Call based API for end-entity client software to use for the automatic
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provisioning of X.509 certificates, and other usual PKI operations.
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Resumo
O tema desta tese e´ o desenvolvimento eficiente de uma Infraestrutura de Chave
Pu´blica (ICP), mais especificamente uma maneira de aprovisionar certificados X.509
de forma segura e automa´tica, utilizando servic¸os web como meio de comunicac¸a˜o
entre a Autoridade Certificadora e as entidades finais.
Este tema e´ interessante pois cada vez mais organizac¸o˜es utilizam servic¸os de ICP
para, por exemplo, comunicar seguramente atrave´s de canais inseguros como a Inter-
net, operac¸o˜es de assinatura digital ou providenciar propriedades de na˜o-repu´dio a
protocolos e sistemas de informac¸a˜o.
Apesar das ICPs serem cada vez mais comuns nas instituic¸o˜es, existem poucos pro-
tocolos conhecidos que permitem aprovisionar certificados X.509 automaticamente,
sendo eles o Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) e o Automatic Certificate
Management Environment (ACME). No entanto o SCEP apresenta falhas de seguranc¸a
e o ACME e´ focado em apenas uma a´rea de aplicac¸a˜o das ICPs.
Analisa´mos o problema e tenta´mos perceber se e´ poss´ıvel implementar o servic¸o
pretendido e tentar perceber se a soluc¸a˜o encontrada pode ser considerada segura. Para
isso, nesta tese fizemos uma pesquisa construtiva para analisar as soluc¸o˜es existentes,
de forma a chegarmos a` soluc¸a˜o por no´s proposta.
Nesta tese apresentamos e descrevemos uma arquitetura para suportar tal servic¸o.
O nosso sistema depende da entrega de elementos de seguranc¸a, como tokens crip-
togra´ficos ou smartcards com um certificado administrativo, a`s entidades finais, que e´
utilizado como aˆncora de seguranc¸a.
Para ale´m da soluc¸a˜o para o nosso objetivo inicial, tambe´m desenvolvemos um con-
junto de infraestruturas para suportar uma ICP funcional, mais especificamente uma
arquitetura para os servic¸os de back-office, um modelo de dados para suportar as
iterac¸o˜es entre as entidades finais e os servic¸os de back-office e uma API baseada
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em chamadas de procedimentos remotos para o software cliente das entidades finais
usarem para o aprovisionamento automa´tico de certificados X.509 assim como para
outras operac¸o˜es de ICP comuns.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Public Key Infrastructures are commonly used and deployed to protect networks, data,
critical business systems and users. Whether they are used to authenticate users and
systems, to provide access control to systems, or to encrypt data, ensure privacy, to
digitally sign documents or emails as a mean to attest their integrity and authenticity,
public key operations are nowadays integral to modern operating systems, commercial
security products and custom built systems. E-commerce, banking, mobile systems or
cloud computing all rely on the use of digital certificate infrastructures to represent
and manage the digital identity of users, connected devices, web services, and business
applications among others [47].
Public key or asymmetric cryptography, is an essential component for the deployment
of PKI systems. It was first discovered by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, two
Stanford mathematicians in 1976 [19]. They were trying to solve two major problems
in cryptography: key distribution and identification. Public key cryptography alone,
is not able to solve these problems because it does not provide a secure and trusted
way to identify the keys owners, neither a way to distribute the public keys among
all possible interested end-entities. So, a new technology was necessary to fill this gap
in public key cryptography, allowing to identify the keys owners and create a way to
efficiently distribute them.
In 1993 Public Key Infrastructure as we know it, began with the establishment of the
X.509 certificate standard in RFC 1422. This document standardized the concepts of
certification authorities, certificate revocation lists, and certificate trust chains that
provided the framework for the more advanced PKI based technologies in use today
[19]. Although PKI is now more than 20 years old, only more recently we started
1
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to see public key cryptography and digital signatures as a ubiquitous part of the IT
landscape [47]. Two well known systems were developed to fill this gap. One is PKI
systems and the other is the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). Both PKI and PGP systems
use public key cryptography, but the systems differ in how they vet and bind public
keys to end-entities identities. PGP is based on a web of trust, or peer to peer trust, so,
it allows end-entities to choose who they trust. In PKIs systems, the trust mechanism
is centralized, so, the end-entities rely on a centralized system (Certificate Authority
(CA)). If an end-entity trust in a CA, then it trusts in all the end-entities that the
CA certified [40].
PKI has evolved, with many standards being created and updated when necessary.
The industry has made great progress in creating these PKI standards in the past
years, and the PKI solutions vendors are providing increasingly robust products. New
PKI technologies and protocols are constantly being developed and there are always
new ways to use the technology [21]. However, many standards are immature and still
need improvements. Although there are lots of really useful things we can do with
PKI, it still has plenty of rough edges and problems that need to be solved [21].
One of the biggest problems in PKI architectures is the first time the Certificate
Authority needs to authenticate the end-entity. An end-entity is a application, such
as an e-mail client, a web server, a VPN-gateway or a person. They are the entities
that will be certified by the PKI. In most cases, human interaction is necessary to
ensure that an end-entity is securely and correctly authenticated. In several cases,
this verification is done through a collection of ad-hoc mechanisms, which regularly
require human interaction. One common end-entity authentication method in PKI is
the following: first an end-entity needs to generate a certificate signing request, copy
and paste it in the CA web page, prove ownership of the end-entity to be certified by
some manual method such as to receive a CA challenge at a (hopefully) administrator-
controlled email address corresponding to the requesting end-entity and then, respond
to it on the CAs web page. After that, it is also necessary to download the issued
certificate and install it in the desired end-entity. This process could be very slow,
and almost impossible to deploy it at a large scale infrastructure.
There are two well known protocols that implement automatic end-entities certificate
provisioning: Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) and the Automatic
Certificate Management Environment (ACME). However SCEP has known security
flaws and ACME is taking its first steps, so lacks field experience, and security flaws
may be discovered when the protocol is more used. Also, ACME is only focused
in issuing certificates to Web Servers, in order to allow HTTPS connections. The
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certificates issued with ACME can only be used for TLS authentication within web
servers. In order to better contextualize and understand the relevant real issues
behind this problem we have conducted a comprehensive research and analysis of
these protocols in order to understand what we can use and what we should avoid.
We will better describe these protocols in the State of the art Chapter.
1.1 Motivation
As a part of the second year in the master degree in Network and Information Systems
Engineering following the Communication Networks minor at Faculty of Sciences of
University of Porto, the students must do a thesis to complete the degree. With the
presented options, and the author’s interest in computer networks and security, the
author has chosen the challenge provide by the problem of large scale secure automatic
provisioning of X.509 certificates via web services.
Our motivation and our objectives consist on deploying a PKI architecture and mech-
anisms, that allow for a fully automated authentication process and end-entities
certificate enrollment. For that, we resort to web services communication mechanisms
between the CA and the end-entities to allow end-entities to enroll certificates in a
secure and automatic way. We consider that this is highly relevant because PKIs have
been present in several companies as a way to secure communications, provide digital
signature mechanisms and other areas of application. More and more companies
are using it and there are more and more devices in the companies making the IT
infrastructures bigger. A good example of these exponential growth is the Internet
of Things (IoT). With IoT, a large number of ”things” suck as electronic devices,
software or sensors have been spread to enable these objects to collect and exchange
data. And this transmitted data, in some way need to be protected from possible
attacks. These bigger and bigger infrastructures have more users, more devices, more
applications and all of them needs to securely communicate. As the number of end-
entities in PKIs are growing exponentially, we think that the necessary processes to
deploy a PKI also needs to be optimized, making the processes more and more easier,
faster, scalable, more configurable and automated. This is the problem that we will
try in a reasonably new way, mitigate and present a solution that can help achieve the
objectives mentioned in the following section.
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1.2 Objectives
The main goal of this thesis is to define and implement a solution which allows
distributed, flexible, secure and scalable architectures for automated security element
provision with X.509 certificates, by the means of web services. We also will try to
achieve the following objectives:
• an infrastructure to support a fully functional PKI
• a framework architecture for PKI backoffice services
• a data model for end-entity interactions with the backoffice PKI services
1.3 Methodology
We followed the following methodology as a guideline in the development of this thesis:
Research on the current state of the art on PKI solutions, PKI operations through
web services and automatic certificate enrollment protocols.
Definition of an architecture that provides certificate life-cycle operations with au-
thentication/ authorization mechanism to ensure PKI reliability.
Implementation of the defined architecture that can be used to fulfill one of the
main goals.
Deployment of the implemented architecture in real scenarios in order to use as
proof of concept usage.
Analyse the developed research, developed work, architecture and protocols done in
the scope of this thesis.
1.4 Assumptions
In the developed solution, we have some assumptions.
One assumption, is that in our developed architecture, the end-entities have deployed
secure elements on the end-entity client mechanism. This secure elements should be
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generic PKCS#11 devices such as cryptographic USB tokens or smartcards. These
secure elements contain a secure microprocessor, a trusted operating system, a cryp-
tographic engine for execution of cryptographic algorithms and secure storage for per-
sistence of sensitive data and keys. The secure elements should be initially provisioned
with a administrative certificate issued by the PKI administrators. Another technical
issue, is that the middleware that is responsible for the communication between the
end-entities software and the secure elements is not within the scope of this thesis.
So, in our architecture, we only present a solution for the communication between the
server side PKI and the end-entities software.
1.5 Outline
This thesis follows the following structure:
• Chapter 2. State of the Art In this chapter the basics of cryptography, Public
Key Infrastructure are described. In this chapter, we also present an overview of
PKI software systems and analyze them. We end the chapter with an overview of
two well known protocols that provide certificate auto enrollment mechanisms.
• Chapter 3. Implementation In this chapter we explain the infrastructure, and
the methodology used for creating the prototype.
• Chapter 4. Practical Use Case Here we propose a possible implementation
of our work with a practical use case.
• Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Work In this chapter we analyze if
the thesis goals were reached, summarize the work done and indicating possible
future developments.
Chapter 2
State of the Art
This chapter contains a good base regarding Cryptography, Public Key Cryptography,
Public Key Infrastructure and Services Communication. Furthermore, we also review
some software used to provide PKI services, PKI operations through web services and
protocols that allow automatic certificate provisioning. This chapter is a result of a
literature study and is the basis for the following chapters.
2.1 Cryptography
Cryptography is the science that study techniques for storing and transmitting data
in a particular form so that only those for whom it is intended can read and process it
[43]. Since the civilization’s early days, there has been a need for secure communication
between two parties. Early on, simple techniques such as invisible inks, tiny pin
punctures on selected characters, minute differences between handwritten characters,
pencil marks on typewritten characters, grilles which cover most of the message except
for a few characters, and so on were used [40]. However, these techniques are not
considered cryptography techniques, because they are based on the omission of the
message or in hiding secret messages in other messages. These kind of techniques
is called steganography [40]. In cryptography, there is no attempt to hide that one
message is being passed through a channel. Instead, if a third party intercepts the
message, they will not understand the message nor the meaning of it. To achieve this,
cryptography uses algorithms in order to cipher and decipher messages. Cryptographic
algorithms are commonly classified as symmetric, asymmetric and one way hash
functions [40].
6
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2.1.1 Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric cryptography, also called secret key cryptography is a kind of cryptography
where the same key is used for encryption and decryption. So, if two parties want
to securely communicate, they need to establish a secret key and share it between
them. One of the first symmetric cryptographic techniques was the Caesar Cipher, in
which each character in the message is replaced with the character a fixed number of
positions above or below it in the alphabet.
Inside of symmetric cryptography, we can sub-divide the algorithms in two different
main groups. One is substitution ciphers where each character in the plaintext is
substituted for another character in the ciphertext. The other one is transposition
ciphers, where the plaintext remains the same, but the order of characters is shuﬄed
around [40].
Symmetric cryptography algorithms present as advantages security and speed relative
to asymmetric cryptography operations. However, there are some disadvantages such
as the necessity to securely share the key. If an attacker gets hold of a symmetric
key, he can read everything encrypted with that compromising key both sides of the
conversation. Another problem of symmetric cryptography is scalability. If there
are 500 people who want to securely communicate with each other, everyone needs
499 different keys to establish separate and secure communication channels with the
others.
Nowadays, the most common algorithms used in the real world are far more advanced
and commit to encrypt blocks of data in several rounds with different block and
key sizes. The most used symmetric cryptography algorithms are the Triple Data
Encryption Standard (3DES), Advance Encryption Standard (AES), International
Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA), Blowfish, CAST-128 and RC5 [50].
2.1.2 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses two different
keys instead of one as in symmetric cryptography. In this cryptographic system we
have two different keys. A private key, that should remain secret by the owner. The
other key, called public key, must be known by the public. Both public and private
key form a key pair which are mathematically linked, however, one key can not be
inferred from the other key, at least in any reasonable amount of time. This key pair
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paradigm will allow for the usual encryption and decryption operations, and add a
signature and signature verification functionalities.
In public key cryptography we have advantages such as the needlessness of securely
exchanging keys, thus eliminating the key distribution problem and can provide digital
signatures that can be repudiated. Although asymmetric cryptography solves the key
distribution problem, it is not enough to solve the key management problem. The
problem with the key management is that there is no way to assure that a given key
belongs to a given user. The user A can publish his public key and identify that key
as his key. However, user B can also publish a public key and claim that that public
key belongs to A. So a third party, which all users trusts, is necessary to ensure the
ownership of a key and a proper identification the key owner. The key management
problem can be solved using Public Key Infrastructure, that will be introduced in the
following chapter.
Relatively to symmetric cryptography, asymmetric cryptographic operations such as
encryption are far slower. There are several public key cryptography algorithms, such
as Diffie–Hellman, ElGamal and RSA. Diffie–Hellman key exchange is mostly used for
two parties that have no prior knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared
secret key over an insecure channel. ElGamal algorithm is based on the difficulty of the
discrete logarithm problem and was invented by Tahir ElGamal in 1985. Among the
above mentioned protocols, the far more popular and used is the RSA algorithm. The
RSA so called because of the author’s names, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard
Adleman is based on the mathematical problem of prime factorization [40].
2.1.3 One Way Hash Functions
One way hash functions, which are used in various functions such as cryptographic
checksums, message digest or fingerprint, are functions that create a fixed sized com-
pressed output from an arbitrary given input and are commonly used to validate
a message integrity. Hash functions should be very easy to compute, but almost
impossible to reverse the operation. So, given a text x and a hash function f(), it
should be very easy and fast to compute f(x), should take a very long time to infer x
from f(x). Also, if a single bit from the input is changed, on the average, half of the
bits in the output should change [40]. Another property that hash functions must have
is the nonexistence of collisions. By collisions, we mean, given an text x and a text y
and an hash function f, if we calculate f(x) and f(y), f(x) and f(y) should not be equals
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[40]. There are some hash algorithms such as MD5 and SHA-1 that were commonly
used but now are no longer collision resistant. SHA-2 is a family of functions with
different output size, which is currently considered secure and widely used.
2.1.3.1 Digital Signatures
Digital signature is an application example of One Way Hash Functions. In the scope
of Public Key Infrastructure, digital signatures are used to ensure that a message was
sent by a user, as also to check his authenticity and integrity. For that, it creates
a one-way hash of the electronic data to be signed. Then, the private key is used
to encrypt the hash and that signed hash is sent to the recipient of the message.
When the recipient receives the message, he uses the sender public key to decrypt the
encrypted hash, apply the same hash function to the message, and if the hashes are
equal, then the recipient knows that the message was sent by the owner of the key,
and that the message was not tampered.
2.2 Public Key Infrastructure
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a set of technical mechanisms, procedures and
policies that collectively provide a framework, using public key cryptography and
digital certificates to ensure the four main security principles: integrity, confidentiality,
non-repudiation and access control in communication through insecure channels such
as the Internet [47]. There is a spread spectrum of applications and services where
a PKI can be applied, as it does not serve a particular purpose rather provides a
foundation for several security services and applications.
2.2.1 PKI Structure
Within any PKI, we find different components. However, there is not a rule which
determines which are really necessary. The required components for the PKI are
the Certificate Authority (CA), digital certificates and end-entities. There are some
components that are optional and can be added to the PKI to split the workload
between the components. The most common components which are commonly used
are a Registration Authority (RA), a Validation Authority (VA) and a Certificate
Repository. Bigger infrastructures are advised to have an RA and a VA, so the CA
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could delegate the workload to those components avoiding possible problems with the
CA workload. Next, we will approach one by one the role of each most common
component in a PKI.
Figure 2.1: Example of common PKI
2.2.1.1 Certificate Authority (CA)
A CA is responsible for creating or certifying identities through the cryptographic
signing of digital certificates. The CA ensures that an entity with a digital certificate
signed by the CA is in fact who he claims to be. For that, the CA carefully checks
if the end-entity who is trying to be certified This means that the person or server
owns the private key corresponding to the given certificate. If there is no trust in the
issuing CA, then we cannot trust any of the certificates that they have issued.
There can be three kinds of CAs: a Root CA, a Subordinate CA and a Leaf CA. A
Root CA has a self-signed certificate. A subordinate CA or a sub CA is a CA whose
certificate is signed by another CA. That CA can be another Sub CA or a Root CA.
The leaf CAs are responsible to issue certificates to the PKI end-entities.
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There can be different design hierarchies to implement a CA structure. We can have
a PKI with only one Root CA, which also is a leaf CA, called a Single/One Tier
Hierarchy, or we can have a Root CA with several sub CAs with a two or three
tier hierarchy, as we can see in Figure 2.2. When we have a multi-tier hierarchy,
we can divide the workload between CAs, as well as end-entities, and if a CA key
is compromised, it is easy to recover from it, because only a part of the PKI issued
certificates will be compromised.
Figure 2.2: Example of hierarchical CAs infrastructure [21]
When we are building a PKI, we should plan which type of hierarchy is the most
appropriate to the case. However, it is recommended to have a multi-tier hierarchy
model when the size of the PKI is medium or large.
The multi-tier hierarchical model allows different CAs issuing certificates to different
classes of end-entities, that can be a region or a country or company’s department.
According to Ned Pyle, ”security increases with the addition of a Tier, and flexibility
and scalability increase due to the increased design options. On the other hand,
manageability increases as there is a larger number of CAs in the hierarchy to manage.
And, of course, the cost goes up” [35]. There is not any recommendation for the limit
number of tiers in a PKI structure, however, it is very unusual to have structures with
more than three tiers.
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2.2.1.2 Hardware Security Modules
Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are hardware devices that safeguards and man-
ages cryptographic keypairs and allow cryptographic operations to be fully carried out
inside the module. HSMs are useful in PKI implementations because, beyond manag-
ing private keys safely inside the module, it can and execute cryptographic operations
inside the module, then oﬄoads the CAs from heavy cryptographic operations. As
the operations are made inside the module, that ensures that the keys never leave
the HSM and therefore cannot be exported and are then much more difficult to steal.
For example, if an attacker gains access the CA machine, he cannot access the keys,
minimizing possible damage [21].
2.2.1.3 Registration Authority
The RA is an optional component of PKI. When the RA is present in a PKI infras-
tructure, the CA delegates to the RA some responsibilities such as authenticating the
end-entities and the information provided by them, and then register entities in the
PKI, making the enrollment request to the CA. The CA trusts the RA to identify
and authenticate entities according to the CAs policy. There can be one or more RAs
connected to each CA in the PKI. Depending on the PKI infrastructure and use mode,
the RA can also be responsible for generating the end-entities key pairs. When this
happens, there must be a secure way to transfer the private key to the end-entity [47].
2.2.1.4 X.509 Certificates
A digital certificate forms a strong association between an identity and the public/pri-
vate key pair held by the holder of the identity. The X.509 Certificates are standard
digital certificates that are defined in several IETF Standards and it has been updated
when necessary. The actual standard is defined in RFC 5280 [4] which defines Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates version 3 and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL).
X.509 Certificates are composed by several fields, some being optionals and others
required. The required ones are:
Version Specifies the version of the certificate. There are three different versions (v1,
v2 and v3).
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART 13
Figure 2.3: General X.509 certificate format [21]
Serial Number This number must be an unique integer for each certificate issued
by one CA.
Signature Algorithm This field contains the signature algorithm used by the CA
to sign the certificate.
Issuer The issuer field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the certificate.
The issuer field must contain a non-empty distinguished name (DN). The DN
can be composed by several fields, that are listed in RFC 1779 [17]. Each DN
can have different fields, and it is up to PKI administrator to define which fields
should be present to precisely identify the end-entity. There are fields such as
CommonName (CN), LocalityName (L), OrganizationName (O), Organization-
alUnitName (OU), CountryName (C) and several others that can be consulted
at [17].
Validity The certificate validity is the period of time during which the CA guarantees
that it will maintain information about the status of the certificate.
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Subject The subject field identifies the entity associated with the public key stored
in the subject public key field.
Subject Public Key Info This field is used to carry the public key and identify the
algorithm with which the key is used.
After the required fields, there are a lot of optional fields that can provide a large
amount of additional information. We can have more information about the end-
entity such as the Subject Alternative Name, as well as the Issuer in the field Issuer
Alternative Name. We can have information about the certificate use constrains in
the Key Usage, Extended Key Usage and Basic Constraints fields. We can also put
on the certificate, information for the certificate validation through the Certificate
Revocation Lists distribution points in the fields CRL Distribution Points and Freshest
CRL. Information about the PKI policy terms can also be present in one URL in the
Certificate Policies field. We can also define special fields, for fields which there is not
a specific field for it. For those special fields an Object Identifier (OID) can be created
and added to the certificate. An OID is used as an identification mechanism jointly
developed by ISO/IEC and ITU-T for naming any type of object, concept or ”thing”
with a global unambiguous name.
2.2.1.5 Validation Authority
A Validation Authority (VA) provides services used to check if a certificate is still
valid. The certificate validation is mostly provided through a service for download-
ing Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and through the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP), however there are other protocols.
Certificate Revocation Lists The X.509 CRLs are defined in RFC 5280 [4] to-
gether with X.509 Certificates. CRLs are a list of certificate serial numbers
issued by a CA that have been revoked. So, if a certificate’s serial number
is present in this list, it means that the certificate should no longer be trusted.
CRLs can be downloaded and stored in the end-entity storage, and can be used to
validate a certificate when other validation mechanisms are oﬄine. There are ten
defined reasons for no longer trusting in a certificate such as key compromise, CA
compromise, cessation of operation or privilege withdrawn. When a certificate
is revoked a, the reason it was revoked is expressed and then that certificate’s
serial number will be present in the next CRL. A diagram of the contents of
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a CRL can be viewed in Figure 2.4. The CRLs are generated and published
periodically, often at a defined interval. After that interval the CRL is not valid
anymore and the CRL issuer should provide new one. When an end-entity wants
to perform some operation, they should verify if the certificate is still valid. The
CRLs validation format has a lot of problems. For example, if a certificate is
revoked and there is still a long time until the next CRL update, it is possible
to perform operations with that revoked certificate, because according to the
last issued CRL, that certificate is steel valid. Other problems with CRLs is
the tendency to grow a lot. However, this last problem can be solved with
the Delta CRLs, which contain updates to the previously distributed revocation
information, rather than all the information that would appear in a complete
CRL [4].
Figure 2.4: Certificate revocation list block diagram [21]
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Online Certificate Status Protocol is a certificate validation alternative created
to specifically address certain problems associated with using CRLs, such as the
necessity of frequent downloads and it uses very few network resources because
it contains less information than a CRL. With OCSP, the clients need to make
a request (normally through http) to the OCSP server with a certificate serial
number. The OCSP server must respond to the client if the certificate is still
valid, if it was revoked, or if he do not know that certificate status. Currently
OCSP is defined in RFC 6960 [36].
Other Validation Protocols Besides CRLs and OCSP, exist some more validation
protocols such as the Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) defined
in the RFC 5055 [11]. SCVP allows a client to delegate certification path
construction and certification path validation to a server.
Certification Chains/Path As referred above in the CAs section, CAs can be
organized in a hierarchical model where, for example a ROOT CA sings a Leaf
CA and this Leaf CA issues certificates to end-entities. When we are validating if
a certificate is still valid through CRLs or OCSP, it is not enough to verify if the
end-entity certificate is still valid. To really ensure the certificate validity we also
need to verify if all the CAs in the chain used to sign the end-entity certificate are
still valid. If one of the nodes in the hierarchical chain were revoked, we could no
longer trust any of the certificates below that compromised node. So, in order
to validate a certificate, we also need to provide a way to get and validate all the
certificates in the chain from a certificate until the ROOT CA. Usually, software
distributions such as operating systems or browsers, comes with a truststore.
These truststores contains a list of common trusted ROOT CAs certificates. If
an end-entity certificate’s chain ends in one of those certificates in the truststore,
then the systems relies on the certificate.
2.2.1.6 Certificate Policy (CP) and Certificate Practices Statement (CPS)
A CP is a defined ”set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to
a particular community and/or class of application with common security require-
ments”. ”CPs typically fall into two major categories. First, some CPs indicate the
applicability of a certificate to a particular community”. ”The second category of
typical CPs indicate the applicability of a certificate to a class of application with
common security requirements” [3]. CPS is a ”statement of the practices which a
certification authority employs in issuing certificates”. ”CPS establishes practices
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concerning lifecycle services in addition to issuance, such as certificate management
(including publication and archiving), revocation, and renewal or re-keying” [3].
2.2.1.7 Certificate Repository
The certificates issued by a CA must be accessible to all entities and available for re-
trieval. For that there must exist a certificate repository that allows certificate fetching
through a network service. Over the past few years, the consensus in the information
technology industry is that the best technology for certificate repositories is provided
by directory systems such as LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol), although
it can be provided by HTTP or FTP as well [9].
2.2.1.8 End-Entities
An end-entity is a application, such as an e-mail client, a web browser, a web server
or a VPN-gateway. End-entities are not allowed to issue certificates to other entities,
they make up the leaf nodes in the PKI certification tree, so, they are the entities that
will be certified by the CAs.
2.2.2 PKI Protocols and Operations
2.2.2.1 Certificate Management Protocols
Certificate Management Protocols define a set of management protocols which defines
which operations can be done and how the communication between the CA and the
end-entities should be conducted regarding the certificates operations life cycle.
There are a few popular management protocols, some being IETF Standards and
others are developed by private companies and are now public IETF drafts. The
principal management protocols are:
• Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), a IETF Standard first defined in RFC
2510 and posteriorly obsoleted by RFC RFC 4210 [1] and RFC 6712 [16].
• Certificate Management Messages Over CMS (CMC), another IETF Standard
first defined in the RFC 2797 and obsoleted by RFC 5272 [39] and RFC 6402
[38].
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• Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard (PKCS#7), a non standard developed
by the RSA Laboratories and defined in the RFC 2315 [15].
• Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP), another non standard protocol
defined in an IETF draft [13]. The SCEP protocol is the one that is most
interesting to for us because SCEP allows automatic certificate enrollment, which
is one of our main goals. SCEP defines a protocol for certificate management
and certificate and for CRL queries. However and after more study about SCEP
we find that SCEP implementation could be susceptible to a Privilege Escalation
Attack. This happens because SCEP does not strongly authenticate certificate
requests made by users or devices [46]. SCEP will be studied in more detail in
a later section.
2.2.2.2 Common PKI Operations and Certificates Life Cycle
In this section we will make a high level abstract review of possible PKI operations,
used for management of keys and certificates through their life cycle from creation
to retirement. These operations are all supported by Certificate Management Pro-
tocols chapter described protocols. We will make a simple overview over the several
operations and how they commonly work.
It all begins with an end-entity who wants to be certified by a CA. For that, an end-
entity start by generating a pair of public/private keys. In this step we must choose
which public key algorithm to use and the key length. We must choose a key length
where the amount of time taken to break the key, given current cryptanalytic attacks
and processing power, is far too long for practical purposes.
The next step is the creation of a certification signing request (CSR) from the generated
key pairs. CSR contains the generated public key and the DN from the requester end-
entity. This public key and DN will be present in the certificate issued by the CA. The
CSR may be in Certification Request Syntax Specification (PKCS#10) format, a non
standard created by RSA Laboratories’s Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)
and defined in the RFC 5967 [45]. PKCS#10 is a binary format for encoding CSRs
for use with X.509. The CST can also be in a Certificate Request Message Format
(CRMF), which is an IETF Standard which defines a syntax used to convey a request
for a certificate and defined in the RFC 4211 [37]. In some PKI implementations, the
key generation is made by the RA. The end-entity makes a certification request to the
RA, the RA authenticates the end-entity and then generates a key pair and make the
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certificate signing request to the CA.
After the RA (we will assume that the entity responsible for this step is an RA) receives
the CSR from the end-entity that wants to be certified, the RA must ensure that the
end-entities requesting the certification are in fact who they claim to be. For that,
the RA must proceed with some or several ways to authenticate the end-entity, which
must be defined in the Certificate Policy from the PKI. The authentication techniques
used will depend on the business risk model of the organization. If it is a simple
organization such as a video renting club, a simple entity authentication process is
enough such as a confirmation e-mail sent to the requester mail account. If the case is
the issuance of a certificate to use in a passport, or a national ID card a more detailed
verification should be required such as personal presence or strong authentication
via tokens, smartcards or biometric authentication systems. This is one of the most
important steps in all the PKI operations. If the authentication process is not secure
and trustworthy enough, any subsequent reliance on the credentials and certificates
issued to that identity could be suspect [49].
After the RA authenticates the requesting end-entity, the RA will request to the CA
the issuing of a new certificate. The CA will issue a new certificate regarding the class
of the requester’s end-entity and the end purpose of the certificate. If the certificate
purpose is digital signing, the certificate will have different constraints that a certificate
which end would be to provide Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security on web
servers. So, according to the end-entity and the certificate’s end the CA will create
and sign a new certificate with the CA private key, sending the new certificate to the
end-entity who requested it or publishing it into a public directory such as an LDAP
based Certificate Repository.
From the moment an end-entity gets a certificate from a CA, it can perform all the
certificate related cryptographic operations. However, we will not analyze the possible
cryptographic operations, instead, we will analyze operations regarding the certificate
life cycle, after the certificate is issued. After a certificate generation, it may go
through the following phases:
Certificate Expiration As expressed above in the X.509 Certificates section, cer-
tificates have a validity time. When that validity expires, certificates should no
longer be trusted. One of the reasons why certificates have expiration dates is the
amount of elapsed time since the certificate issuance could be enough to break
the keys. Another reason could be that the revocation status may no longer be
published in the CRLs which make it impossible to know if the certificate was
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revoked or simply to make certificate owners pay a renovation fee [21].
Certificate Renewal The certificate renewal operation is an operation that normally
occurs near to the certificate’s expiration date. This operation may be performed
in two different ways. One of them is when the same keys, from the prior
certificate, are used. The other option is replacing the keys for a new key pair
[21]. The most usual and advised is to generate a new key pair. For the same
reason why certificates expire, that is the possibility of compromised keys, a
new key pair should be created for the new certificate. However, there are cases
where it could be admissible to use the same keys. In situations where certificates
are issued with a short expiration date. Situations such as temporary workers
or visitors on a company. If, for example, a certificate generated with 2048 bit
length key pairs with a two months expiration date, if it was necessary to extend
the expiration date, the same keys could be used because it is not likely to crack
a 2048 bit key pair in that amount of time. This operation is applicable both to
end-entities and CAs because the CA keys also have an expiration date.
The certificate renewal operation should be used instead of certificate expiration/
new certificate request. That is because there is no necessity of a new authen-
tication process, as the proof of ownership of the private key corresponding
to the about to expire certificate is enough to guarantee a strong end-entity
authentication.
Certificate Revocation A certificate may be revoked at any time prior to the expi-
ration date. Unfortunately, mathematical attacks are not the only way to subvert
a cryptographic security scheme. Keys may be discovered due to errors in poor
software implementations, analysis of hardware key storage. For that, the CAs
needs to save the status of all issued certificates and provide ways to revoke the
issued affected certificates. When a certificate is revoked, the CA needs to change
the status of the certificate to revoked and publish the certificate status in all
certificate validation protocols available on the PKI. The certificate revocation
is a sensible operation and access should be very restrictive. A wrong certificate
revocation will force the issuance of a new certificate, having to repeat all steps
for issuing a new certificate unnecessarily. There are ten possible revocation
reasons defined the RFC 5280 [4], they being:
• 0 - unspecified
• 1 - keyCompromise
• 2 - CACompromise
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• 3 - affiliationChanged
• 4 - superseded
• 5 - cessationOfOperation
• 6 - certificateHold
• 8 - removeFromCRL
• 9 - privilegeWithdrawn
• 10 - AACompromise
There is a special type of revocation type that is certificate revocation reason
number 6: certificate hold. In this particular case and this only, the revocation
status can be reversed. This special case can be applied in situations where
there is no certainty that the certificate has been compromised. As there is no
certainty, the certificate is put on hold. When a certificate is on hold, it cannot be
trusted. When it is confirmed that the keys were compromised, it is necessary
to permanently revoke it with one of the other reasons or we can restore the
certificate status to valid again if the suspicion of the certificate compromise
does not verify [21]. When a certificate is revoked the users should know the
reason why it was revoked and the date when it was revoked as well. Both CRLs
and OCSP contain that data.
Key pair archival and recovery When the intent of a certificate and respective
key pairs is to cypher data, keys archival and recovery operations should be
possible. If a private key, for some reason, is lost, the recovery of those lost keys
is necessary to recover all data encrypted with a key. If the key is permanently
lost, we can consider that all the encrypted information is unreadable, and so,
forever lost. For that, keys should be securely archived after being generated.
However, when keys are generated in smartcards or cryptographic tokens, and
they do not allow export private keys, the keys archival is not possible. In those
cases, it is necessary to be very careful with the smartcards or tokens not to lose
or damage them, or simply, do not use cryptographic tokens that do not allow
export private keys to cypher data [21].
Cross-Certification Cross-Certification is a simple entity certification, but instead
certifying end-entities, the CA certify another CA outside the current CAs
infrastructure. This operation allows that end-entities from a CA can securely
communicate with the end-entities from another different CA. But for that, there
must be confidence between the CAs, and believe that the entity authentication
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by the other CAs are reliable and can be trusted. There can be cross-certification
between CAs in one direction or in both directions [21].
2.3 PKI Software Solutions
PKI software solutions are purpose-designed computer software used to implement
some of the PKI operations and elements such as CAs and RAs. Now we will make a
brief analysis of four different solutions, describing what they offer.
2.3.1 Microsoft Windows Certificate Authority
Since Windows Server 2000, Microsoft offers Certificate Services systems through
Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). AD CS provides customizable services
for issuing and managing public key certificates [41]. AD CS supports a lot of PKI
features and components that can be optionally installed using Server Manager, they
being:
CAs AD CS allows the creation of Root CAs and subordinate CAs, allowing the
creation of a hierarchical set of CAs. With the created CAs is possible to issue
certificates to users, computers, and services, and to manage certificate validity.
CA Web enrollment This feature allows human end-entities to connect to a CA
web page to request certificates and retrieve CRLs.
Online Responder The Online Responder acts like an OCSP responder. It responds
to revocation status requests and answers with a signed response containing the
requested certificate status information. CRLs and delta CRLs can also be
provided.
Network Device Enrollment Service With this feature it is possible to obtain
certificates for routers and other network devices, that do not have domain
accounts.
Certificate Enrollment Web Service The Certificate Enrollment Web Service en-
ables end-entities certificate enrollment through web services using the HTTPS
protocol. Together with the Certificate Enrollment Policy Web Service, this
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enables policy-based certificate enrollment when an end-entity is not a member
of a domain or when a domain member is not connected to the domain.
Certificate Enrollment Policy Web Service With this, end-entities can obtain
certificates enrollment policy information [20].
This software was not deeply studied, because, beyond a Windows Server License
purchase is necessary in order to deploy a PKI service with it, this software is more
applied to certify computers in Windows domains networks, so, it does not fit as a
solution to our objectives.
2.3.2 OpenCa
OpenCA is an Open Source PKI Project and results from a collaborative effort to
develop a robust, full-featured and out-of-the-box Certification Authority that imple-
ments the most used protocols with full-strength cryptography world-wide. For that
OpenCA uses several open source softwares such as OpenLDAP, OpenSSL, Apache
Project, Apache mod ssl. OpenCA can be deployed on Linux, Solaris and MacOS x
operating systems. The project development is divided into two main tasks: studying
and refining the security scheme that guarantees the best model to be used in a CA
and developing software to easily setup and manage a Certification Authority [27].
However the project seems to be a little stopped since the last version of OpeCA with
codename ”SpecialK” was launched in August 2013.
OpenCa offers five different web interfaces that are used to manage the available
components: CA, RA, LDAP and a public interface also called web-gateway. The web
interfaces offered are the following [26]:
Node The Node interface manages the database and handles all the export and
import functionalities.
CA This interface has all the functions which we need to create certificates and
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and also includes all the functions which
we can use to change the configuration via a web interface.
RA In the OpenCA interface is possible to handle several requests such as editing
requests, approving requests, creating private keys with smart cards, delete
wrong requests and email users.
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LDAP The LDAP interface was implemented to separate the LDAP management
completely from the rest of the software. This was done because there are many
functions which are really specific for LDAP administrators, with only a few
users needing these features.
Pub In the Public interface we can do all the small things which the users need more
specifically the following:
• Generate CSRs for Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla 1.1+, Netscape
Communicator and Navigator
• Generate client independent requests and private keys
• Receive PEM-formatted PKCS#10 requests from servers
• Enrolls certificates
• Enrolls CRLs
• Search certificates
• Check certificate status
• Tests user certificates in browsers
Besides OpenCA supports all the necessary components we think that are necessary
to our solution, we find some disadvantages such as do not offer OCSP support, CRL
updates are manually made and scalability is difficult to achieve with increase of
complexity [12]. Due this we decided not to use OpenCA in our solution.
2.3.3 Dogtag Certificate System
Dogtag Certificate System (DCS) is an open source implementation of a software
system designed to manage Public Key Infrastructure deployments. DCS has six
highly-configurable subsystems, which provide flexibility in designing the PKI. The
six subsystems that comprise DCS are [7]:
Certificate Authority The CA is the subsystem that provides certificate manage-
ment functionality for issuing, renewing, revoking, and publishing certificates.
It is also responsible for creating and publishing CRLs. The DCS CA is a
highly configurable set of software components and tools to manage all the
certificate life-cycle using standards and services that facilitate the use of public-
key cryptography and X.509 version 3 certificates.
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Data Recovery Manager The Data Recovery Manager (DRM) is an optional sub-
system that provides private encryption key storage and retrieval.
OCSP Manager The OCSP Manager is an optional subsystem that provides OCSP
responder services. However, this manager does not access the CA each time it
wants to know a certificate status, but stores the last issued CRL and answers
the OCSP request based on the CRL taking from users the load of verifying
certificate status in a CRL.
Registration Authority This RA is a subsystem that provides local enrollment
request verifications. The RA can accept enrollment requests and authenticates
them in a local context and then forwards the enrollment request to the desig-
nated CA to generate the certificate. The RA can be configured in two different
ways. One in which the RA can set up with the appropriate authentication
plugin to authenticate the request in an automated fashion and the one where
the RA has a local request queue where requests can be stored and reviewed by
local RA agents for manual authentication.
Token Key Service The Token Key Service (TKS) manages one or more master
keys required to set up secure channels directly to the token management system.
The privileged operations such as key generation can only be requested on the
tokens through a secure channel.
Token Processing System The Token Processing System (TPS) provides the reg-
istration authority functionality in the token management infrastructure and
establishes secure channels between the Enterprise Security Client (ESC) and
the back-end subsystems.
Beyond the functionalities described above, DCS also provides a few more tools that
help the PKI management.
Certificate profiles The DCS provides certificate profiles that are used to configure
the content of certificates, the constraints for issuing the certificate, the enroll-
ment method used, and the input and output forms for that enrollment. DCS
comes with set of certificate profiles for the most common certificate ends as
we can see in Figure 2.5. The administrator can modify and create certificate
profiles, but he needs to send them to an agent services page for an agent approve.
After the agent approve the certificate profile a dynamically-generated HTML
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Figure 2.5: DCS Certificates Profiles Web Page [7]
form is available for the certificate profile and can be used in the end-entities
page for certificate enrollment requests.
HSMs and Crypto Accelerators The DCS supports HSMs and crypto accelera-
tors provided by third-party vendors of PKCS#11-compliant tokens.
The server can be configured to use different PKCS#11 modules to generate
and store key pairs for all Certificate System subsystems. PKCS#11 hardware
devices also provide key backup and recovery features for the information stored
on the hardware token.
Enterprise Security Client The ESC is a cross-platform client for end users to
register and manage keys and certificates on smart cards or tokens. This is the
final component in the Certificate System token management system, with the
TPS and TKS.
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Command Line Interfaces DCS offers two different CLIs. One called pki-server
CLI that can be used to manage PKI servers on the local machine. The command
does not require authentication, but it should only be accessed by the system
administrator. The other CLI is for accessing PKI services remotely given that
it is possible to execute some commands without authentication, but another
set of commands need authentication through username/password or with a
certificate.
REST Web Services PKI provides REST interfaces to allow clients access services
on the server. The REST services are implemented in REST style.
2.3.4 EJBCA
EJBCA is a multi-platform PKI Certificate Authority software build with JAVA, li-
censed under the Lesser General Public License, and is mainly developed by PrimeKey
Solutions AB. EJBCA is an acronym for Enterprise Java Beans Certificate Authority.
EJBCA is an Enterprise Java Beans (EJBs) application and needs an application
server to be executed in. The structure of EJBCA is based on a modular design where
packages can be modified and whole components can be moved or added. EJBCA
supports a number of certificate management protocols used in a PKI, more specifically
SCEP, a subset of CMP, PKCS#7 and PKCS#10. Regarding validation protocols,
EJBCA offers certificate validation through CRLs, Delta CRLs generation and OCSP.
EJBCA introduced some concepts to help the PKI administration and management
and to facilitate the certificate and user management, their being:
Certificate Profiles In an EJBCA certificateProfile we can define which non user
specific content will be present in issued certificates. Here, we can define the
available key lengths, the signature algorithm and the type of entities the cer-
tificate will suit, so, if the certificate is for a CA or for an end-entity. We can
also define X.509v3 extensions which will be present in the issued certificates,
such as key usage, extended key usage, basic constraints, key constrains among
other extensions. Some extensions can be pre-set with a value, for example
CRLDistributionPoint, where the same value is used in all certificates from the
same profile. Here is also determined if these certificates will be published and
in which publisher. We can link these certificate profiles to CAs, leaving only
those CAs issue certificates with a given certificate profile.
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End-entity profiles End-entityProfiles define which parts of DN should be registered
for various types of end-entities. It defines which parts that are already pre-set,
and which can be modified. It also contains other information, that is specific
to each individual end-entity. An End-EntityProfile can be linked to specific
CertificateProfiles and CAs so users belonging to a specific EndEntityProfile can
only get certificates from the specified CertificateProfile and CAs.
Publishers A publisher stores issued certificates to a central location. EJBCA sup-
ports LDAP, more specifically OpenDJ and OpenLDAP and Active Directory
but it is also possible to create customized plug-ins.
Crypto Tokens A Crypto Token in EJBCA is where keys are stored. A Crypto
Token can be either backed by a software keystore, in a file on the database, or
in a HSM PKCS#11 slot.
Users Public Web Page EJBCA provide a public web page where all users can
access and make some operations. These operations are divided in 4 categories:
Enroll, Retrieve, Inspect and Miscellaneous as we can see on Figure 2.6. In the
Enroll section, users have four options for making certificate requests and get
them. The Retrieve section allows users fetch CA Certificates, CAs CRLs and
users last certificate. The Inspect section allow users inspect a certificate or
PKCS#10 requests and the Miscellaneous section allows users search for user
certificates by DN and check certificate’s revocation status.
Administrators Private Web Page The administration page is only accessible through
an administrator certificate login and it is accessible through an HTTPS session.
In there we have a GUI that gave administrators several information about all
PKI elements such as CAs and allows administrators do all kinds of operations as
well. The page is divided in 4 sections: CA Functions, RA Functions, Supervision
Functions and System Functions like we can see in Figure 2.7. In CA Functions
section the administrator can have an overview about the CAs and Publishers
status, activate or deactivate CAs, create CAs, create or edit Certificates Profiles
and manage Crypto Tokens. In RA Functions section the administrator can add
or delete end-entities, as End-EntitiesProfiles
Command Line Interfaces (CLI) EJBCA offers Command Line Interfaces which
allow administrators directly access the machine where EJBCA is installed.
There is a CLI in the proper installation of EJBCA and other, that can be put
on any machine and run independently of EJBCA. EJBCA CLIs contains many
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Figure 2.6: EJBCA Users Public Web Page
functions that can be used in scripts, or come to rescue when the administrator
certificate has expired or if we accidentally revoke our administrator privileges
for the Administration Web Page.
Web Service Interface EJBCA also have a Web Service interface which uses SOAP
over HTTPS that allows remote administration and integration with any kind
of software.
Besides the features above mentioned, EJBCA also provide a lot of features EJBCA
allows the creation of CAs, sub CAs, and a whole type of CAs hierarchy as the creation
of sub CAs signed by an external CA, which allows building several infrastructures
within a single instance of EJBCA. EJBCA also allows export and import CAs, which
make EJBCA quiet portable and scalable. EJBCA supports storing private keys
either in software mode in a key store or in a HSM, providing support to the following
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Figure 2.7: EJBCA Private Administration Web Page
HSMs: nCipher nShield/netHSM, Utimaco CryptoServer, AEP Keyper, ARX CoSign,
Bull Trustway Proteccio, Bull Trustway PCI Crypto Card, SafeNet Luna and SafeNet
ProtectServer.
EJBCA also has a Logging Tool that supports a customizable log with internal log
messages configurable in different languages and the signing of audit logs.
EJBCA supports a distributed infrastructure. We can separate or reproduce some
services separated from the central EJBCA installation. We can have an external
VA Installation or an external RA as well. With this we can guarantee a higher
performance and availability in this crucial PKI service.
We can configure additional security measures with requests / approval mechanisms
where he can define that some operations needs an administrator or more approvals
in order to complete a request [50] [41] [31] [29] [33].
EJBCA is widely used worldwide, ranging from installations in small companies, for
missions critical installations in multinational companies and governments such as
France’s Ministry of Defense and Finances, the National Swedish Police Board or
Zurich University of Applied Sciences. We can see more successfully deployed PKIs
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using EJBCA in here [28].
We think that Dogtag Certificate System and EJBCA are a very complete systems
with a lot of features, as well as the further presented APIs.
Between the Dogtag and EJBCA systems, we choose EJBCA to deploy our system
because we think that it provides more features. EJBCA can be run on any system
with JAVA. We also think that EJBCA is more widely used than Dogtag and have
more documentation. Beyond these arguments, EJBCA is a well proved software,
being used in many important institutions to support PKIs systems, as we can see
here [28].
2.4 Services Communication
In our implementation, we need to enable communication between services. That
communication can be made through Web Services, so we made a study about Web
Services, what kind of web services exists and their main features.
Web Services has many imprecise and ambiguous definitions. This happens because
the term derives from the different existing concepts of web services. The World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C), the main international standards organization for the World
Wide Web (WWW), describes web services as ”a software system designed to support
interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a network” [48]. These interactions
usually are made through the Word Wide Web (WWW) typically delivered over Hyper
Text Transport Protocol (HTTP). The communication payloads of web services are
usually XML documents, however, when performance demands web services can also
use binary payloads. A web service is thus a distributed application whose components
can be deployed and executed on distinct devices. Web services can be identified in
two major classes:
2.4.1 Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) Based
SOAP is a communication protocol based on eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
messages and those messages is defined in a Web Service Definition Language (WSDL).
SOAP web services are independent of any platform, transport protocol, or operating
system, but although they are not tied to any particular transport protocol, HTTP
is the most popular. They can be run on any platform and written in any language
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as long as they can formulate and understand SOAP messages. In SOAP-based web
services the information about the server resources are hidden since all requests are
made to the same URL [14].
Figure 2.8: Architecture of a typical SOAP-based web service [14]
SOAP web services generally encompass two major types of application interaction
patterns [22]:
Document Style In the Document interaction style the Web service request takes
the form of a complete An XML document that is intended to be processed
whole. The XML document can be validated against pre-defined XML schema
document. The document approach is easier because it simply relies on XML
Schema to describe exactly what the SOAP message looks like while transmis-
sion.
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) Style RPC indicates that the SOAP message body
contains an XML representation of a method or a procedure call with associ-
ated input and output parameters to generate XML structures that represent a
method call stack.
2.4.2 REpresentation State Transfer (REST)
REST or RESTfull web services are a kind of software architecture for networks
connected through hyperlinks. REST gives a coordinated set of constraints to the
design of components in a distributed hypermedia system that can lead to a higher
performing and more maintainable architecture [10]. The most well known applied
domains for REST-style is the World Wide Web that is a distributed network of
hypermedia. By order words, the RESTful web service is a subset of the Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI) which provides a uniform interface semantics to manipulate
web resources [14]. The main aspects of REST are:
• Resource Identification through URIs
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• Hyperlinks to define relationships between resources and valid state transitions
of the service interaction
• Uniform Interface for all resources (HTTP as the Application-level Protocol,
observe Table 2.1)
Table 2.1: HTTP verbs meaning in REST web services
HTTP Verb Meaning in REST
GET Query a resource in web server
POST Create a resource in a web server
PUT Update an existing resource in a web server
DELETE Delete a resource in a web server
2.5 PKI Services Communication through APIs
In our study, we find some softwares that provide APIs to access some of the func-
tionalities of the whole software. As we refer in the PKI Software Solutions chapter
EJBCA and Dogtag offers APIs to access the software’s features. We will now make
a brief description of each one.
2.5.1 Dogtag WS API
The DCS offers a REST interface to allow entities to access services on the server.
The API was made using the REST web service style. In terms of design, the API
interface uses regular HTTP verbs, they being GET for fetches data, POST to create
new entries in the namespace and PUT to update fields in the namespace. We can
see a resume of all the DCS REST API on this web page [5]. The REST service
is implemented as a Java class that implements the resource interface. The REST
service class will only exist on the server. A base class called PKIService is provided
to simplify the implementation. The API provides a method that can be used to limit
the authentication methods for each class of users that can be used to access the REST
methods. The API also offers an access control tool where it is possible to define who
can access the REST methods. As a client, it is possible to use a normal browser, or a
special designed client using programming languages such as Java or Python [6]. DCS
provides API calls for managing several objects, their being:
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Controller Objects In here is possible to calculate token session key, encrypt data,
create random blocks of data and Calculate upgraded key set data for token
symmetric key changeover.
Certificates Where we can get the list of certificates, get info about a certificate, get
a certificate and get the status of a certificate through OCSP response.
Certificate Status In here we can modify and get a certificate status.
Certificate Requests In this one we can get a list of requests and their details and
add or modify a request.
Certificate Request Status In this managing object, we can approve or deny re-
quests, and get the status of a request made.
Certificate Profiles In here we can get list of certificate profiles, get certificate
profile details, add or modify a profile and delete a profile.
Certificate Revocation List In this one we can get a list of CRLs and their details,
get a CRL, add a CRL, modify a CRL and delete a CRL.
CA for OCSP In this managing object, we can get a list of CAs, get CAs details,
add or modify a CA and delete a CA.
Keys In here we can get a list of keys, get a key, get a key details and add a key.
Key Requests In the key request management object we can get a list of key requests
and their details, add or get a key to/from archival.
Key Request Status With this managing object we can modify a key request sta-
tus, get key request status and delete a key request.
Users In here we can get the list of users, get users details, add or modify users and
delete a user.
System In here we can get some subsystem information such as status, stats, logs
and log contents.
Config Using this management object we can and get and modify a lot of configura-
tions. For more information about the API, see [5]
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2.5.2 EJBCA Web Service API
Since EJBCA 3.4, EJBCA introduced a JAX-WS 2.0 Web Service Interface, a SOAP
Web Services described in a WSDL, used to access EJBCA basic functions. The
functionality currently available through the Web Service Interface is documented in
the EJBCA Web Service API Reference that can be visited in this javadoc [34]. The
Web Services interface requires client certificate authentication from administrators,
in the same way as the administrator GUI does. If we want that this functionality
to be available in an EJBCA installation, it is necessary to configure a proper file for
that during the EJBCA installation. However, for using this web service we need to
get all the external libraries that EJBCA provides in order to be able to develop some
functionalities using Java. In these libraries are some objects that are used as API
calls answers as the possible exception objects that the API can return. There are
also libraries such as Bouncy Castle for cryptography operations and Log4J for logging
operations. There is a set of access rules for accessing the provided functionalities that
can be viewed in here [31].
2.5.3 Certificate Auto Enrollment Protocols
We will now analyze the protocols which contain certificate auto enrollment mecha-
nisms. These protocols allow end-entities request certificates to the CA without, or
with a minimal human interaction. We will analyze Simple Certificate Enrollment
Protocol and Automatic Certificate Management Environment protocol. With this
study we want to understand what are the good parts of these protocols, and if
possible, use the same mechanisms as they use. We also want to understand the bad
parts of these protocols to avoid the same flaws that are present in these protocols.
2.5.3.1 Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP)
SCEP was developed by VeriSign Inc. for Cisco Systems with the purpose of allowing
network administrators to easily enroll network devices for certificates in a scalable
and automatic manner.
SCEP supports the following general operations:
• CA and RA public key distribution.
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• Certificate enrollment.
• Certificate renewal/update.
• Certificate query.
• CRL query.
We will focus in the certificate enrollment and renewal operations, because they are
the ones with the most interest for us. There are three different possible ways to
authenticate the end-entity who is requiring a certificate:
1. The first case is when the end-entity already has a certificate issued by the SCEP
server, so the server supports certificate renewal, and the request should be
signed with that certificate.
2. The second case is when the end-entity has not a certificate issued by the SCEP
server, but has credentials from an alternate CA, and when this happens and
the PKI policy allows it, the certificate from the alternate CA may be used to
sign the request.
3. The third case is when the end-entity does not have any appropriate certificate.
The end-entity should create a self-signed certificate and use the same subject
DN in the self-signed certificate and in the PKCS#10 request.
When the first and second mechanisms are used, the CA can use the already existent
certificates in order to surely authenticate the client and determine the appropriate
authorization and allow an automated enrollment using existing end-entity credentials.
When the third mechanism is used, SCEP allows two different authorization mecha-
nisms for the initial enrollment, a manual way where the requester has to wait for an
operator to approve a request and a pre-shared secret way where the SCEP server uses
a challenge password that must be securely delivered to the end-entity requester and
then include that challenge password with the certificate request made to the SCEP
server [13].
The problem is that in the automatic way, with the challenge password, end-entities
which have a challenge password provided by the SCEP server are able to make a
certificate request with the identification data that the end-entity wants.
Because this mechanism does not contain a secure authentication mechanism, it may
be possible for an end-entity to take a valid SCEP challenge password, and use it to
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obtain a certificate that represents a different end-entity or for example an end-entity
with a higher authorization access, or to obtain a different type of certificate than
what was intended [42].
2.5.3.2 Automatic Certificate Management Environment)
The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) is a communication
protocol to automate the interactions between a CA and the end-entities, more specif-
ically, web servers. The protocol purpose is to automate the deployment of certificate
enrollment processes at a very low cost and it is defined in an IETF draft [2].
ACME protocol was created to serve as a support to the Let’s Encrypt Certificate
Authority, an Electronic Frontier Foundation initiative that aims to provide free X.509
certificates for Transport Layer Security encryption (TLS) via an automated process
designed to eliminate the current complex processes. The main goal of this initiative
is to clear the remaining roadblocks to transition the Web from HTTP to HTTPS,
taking to a more secure Web browsing experience. The initiative contributors are
Mozilla, Cisco, Akamai, IdenTrust, and researchers at the University of Michigan and
will be operated by a new non-profit organization called the Internet Security Research
Group [8].
Going back to the ACME protocol. The protocol describes an extensible framework for
automating certificate issuance and a domain validation procedure, thereby allowing
servers and infrastructural software to obtain certificates without user interaction.
As the ACME purpose is to provide certificates to web sites, it performs domain
name authentication by the CA to the web server. In domain name authentication or
Domain Validation the CA verifies that the requester has effective control of the web
server and/or DNS server for the domain, but does not explicitly attempt to verify
their real-world identity.
ACME allows a client to request certificate management actions using a set of JSON
messages carried over HTTPS. The first step of ACME protocol is the end-entity
registration with the ACME server. At ACME, the end-entities are identified by
cryptographic key pairs, and then it is possible to add domains to the key pair account.
When an end-entity wants to add a new domain to their account, it needs to prove two
things: that it holds the private key of the account key pair, and that it has authority
over the identifier being claimed, so the domain name.
To prove that it holds the account key pairs, all messages from the end-entity to
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the ACME server are signed with the account private key and validated with the
certificate. To prove that it owns the domain being claimed, the server issues the end-
entity a set of challenges. These challenges can be different, depending on the case, the
ACME server will choose from an extensible set of challenges that are appropriate for
the identifier being claimed. The end-entity responds to the server with the challenge’s
answers and the ACME server validate the answers. If the challenges are successfully
the ACME server will authorize to issue certificates to the pretended domain. The
end-entity needs to send a PKCS#10 to the ACME server signed with the private
key of the account key pair. The issued certificate is assigned to a URI, which the
end-entity can use to fetch the certificate or updated versions of the certificate [2].
In our opinion, this protocol serves for the purpose it was made, more specifically
automate web server domains certification. However, in the scope of this thesis
objective, this protocol is not enough embracing. By that we mean that we may want
to certify different types of end-entities, and the scope of ACME is more directed to
certify web servers and the domains they serve.
Chapter 3
Implementation
In this chapter, we describe in detail the main technological components that we
have employed in our implementation. We will explain how we have used already
existing technologies, and what we have created in order to successfully create a
solution for our problem. We will present the main idea who leads to the deployment
of our PKI system, and what we need to create to support all the possible PKI
operations. We have created an Application Programming Interface (API) in order to
enable communication between the end-entities and the backend created, a backend
database to save important data to the system functionality such as the end-entities
management, and the already existent software we have used to build our solution.
3.1 Main Idea
We will now explain the developed idea, that served as our guide during the imple-
mentation of our solution.
As have already been said before, one of the assumptions of this architecture, is that
end-entities have in their possession, a cryptographic token or a smartcard to store
certificates and protect private keys. The proposed idea is to give end-entities a cryp-
tographic token or smartcard already provisioned with one administrative certificate
and keypair.
This certificate, lets call it administrative certificate, will be issued by one special CA
from the CAs architecture, lets call him administrative CA. This administrative CA
is a CA that only issues administrative certificates. Administrative certificates should
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not be used for other ends that not for authentication with our services.
We now have two possible cases. The first case is when we already know which
end-entities we will use our services. In this case, we could issue the administrative
certificate with the information from each end-entity in the subject DN of the certifi-
cate. In case we do not know who our end-entities will be, we will generate a general
administrative certificate that does not identify an end-entity, but identify a class of
end-entities. This last approach will give us an authentication problem further because
we cannot ensure that an end-entity that request a certificate is who it claims to be.
So, an additional authentication process should be used to authenticate an end-entity,
such as an external certificate from another commonly trusted PKI.
Back to the CAs infrastructure. We would have different administrative CAs, each
one of them would issue certificates to identify different classes of end-entities. For
example, we would have an administrative CA for administrators end-entities, another
for end-entities from one class of end-entity, and other administrative CA for another
class of end-entities. A class of users is a set of end-entities with the same role, with
access to the same type of certificate profiles and the same set of authorized operations.
So, after provisioning the secure elements with the administrative certificates, these
tokens should be delivered to the respective end-entities. We assume that our tokens
will be correctly delivered to the end-entities.
With this process, we are able to identify the end-entity and the class the it belongs
to.
Now, the administrative certificate will be used by end-entities to authenticate with
our services. With this, we ensure that only end-entities to whom we gave secure
elements are able to access our protected services.
We provide three different ways to end-entities communicate with our services. One
of them, is the API that we created, where all the operations can be made. The other
two ways are used to validate certificates, one of them through an OCSP responder
and the other is a CRL provider. To access these two validation services there is no
need to authenticate end-entities, being open to all the public as is common to all PKI
we know.
When an end-entity want to perform some operation, they should invoke the appro-
priate API call. They will be able to perform a set of operations, according to the
administrative certificate we gave them.
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That happens because, each class of end-entities (or a set of end-entities with the same
administrative certificate) have a set of authorized operations that they can perform.
The operations that each class of end-entities can perform are stored in the database
created to support the backoffice operations. So, each time an end-entity make an API
call, that needs authentication and authorization, we first check if it have permission
to do it.
From now one, end-entities can use our API and make requests or, or if they want,
program a set of operations in order to automatize a set of common operations.
All processes need to be set up to be automatized. In our case, the initial setup
requires some work. Before the process automation it is necessary to create the CAs
infrastructure, create the administrative certificates in the secure elements and delivers
them to the end-entities. When the end-entities receive the tokens the provisioning
process can be completely automated.
3.2 PKI Arquitecture
The main goal of our work is to create a solution to provide an automatic way to
provisioning X.509 Certificates via web services, in a large scale and secure mode,
however, it was also a goal the creation of a proposal for a full infrastructure to
provide most common PKI operations. With this work, we also will provide PKI
operations such as certificate validation, certificate revoking and certificate renewing,
that we will now present.
We created a set of components to compose an infrastructure to support the PKI and
all the operations. Those components were created using virtual machines, with the
exception of the HSM, that is a piece of hardware that cannot be virtualized, and the
end-entities secure elements for the same reason. We used the Kernel Virtual Machine
(KVM) to create the virtual machines that composes our infrastructure, as we can see
in Figure 3.1.
• EJBCA as CA
• EJBCA Database
• HSM
• API as RA, VA and Publisher.
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• Backend Database
• Standard OCSP Responder for standard softwares.
• CRLs provider for standard softwares.
• End-entities with client software and security elements
We now describe the role of each component of the infrastructure.
EJBCA and HSM In this infrastructure component we have an installation of the
EJBCA software and it will work as the Certificate Authority. This machine is
in a private zone, that is not accessible from the Internet. This private zone is
protected by a firewall. In the firewall, the EJBCA machine access is limited to
connections coming from the API, OCSP responder and the CRL provider, that
composes the frontend layer. Beyond the access to the CA being protected by
the firewall, all the communications between the CA and the frontend layer are
made through HTTPS connections. In the case of the API, the communication
between the EJBCA and the API is made using the EJBCA Web Services API,
which also encrypts his communication. Beyond this, the only way to access
the EJBCA machine, should be in a ”physical” way. Together with the EJBCA
machine should be as well an HSM to save the CAs key pairs and to perform
cryptographic operations. The purpose of only allowing connections from the
frontend layer machines, is to guarantee that the CAs keypairs and the proper
CA are more secure.
EJBCA Database The EJBCA Database, for security and portability reasons, is in
a separated from the EJBCA machine. It is protected by the firewall as well.
API The API is responsible for receiving communications from the end-entities. All
the requests to the API are made through an HTTPS connection to ensure secure
and confidential communication.
Backend Database The Backend database, that supports all API related operations
is on a different machine than API for security and portability reasons.
Standard OCSP Responder This machine is a standard OCSP responder, as de-
fined in the EJBCA documentation, more specifically in [30]. This was added to
the infrastructure in order to allow standard services such as browsers validate
certificates created by our infrastructure.
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Figure 3.1: Public Key Infrastructure Proposed
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CRL Provider The CRLs Provider’s act as a bridge between the end-entities and
the EJBCA CRL provider. EJBCA provides public pages for the download of
CRLs, however, as the EJBCA machine is the protected zone, these pages are
not accessible from the Internet, so we had to create this bridge to enable the
CRLs download.
end-entities The end-entities have a client software to interact with the API. This
client software allows the end-entities to invoke the API to perform the desired
operations. The end-entities can use the client that we provide in order to auto-
mate interactions with our services. Only end-entities with our administrative
certificates are able to communicate with our API.
3.2.1 Backend Database
The Backend Database was created to support end-entities management, end-entities,
permissions, to store certificates and data to make requests to EJBCA. The Figure 3.2
is an EER Diagram of the created database. The Figure 3.2 was created using the
MySQL Workbench software.
We will now explain the purpose of each table and how they are related.
Table CAs This table is used to store EJBCA CAs data. Data such as the CA
CommonName and the whole CA DN. It also have a field to store the last
CRL retrieved from EJBCA and the date it was retrieved. This information is
necessary to make some operations such as certificate requests, CRLs requests
or certificate revoke requests.
Table CertificateProfile This table’s purpose is to store data of existent certifi-
cateProfiles in EJBCA. As the CAs table, the information in this table it is
necessary to make EJBCA requests.
Table EndEntityProfile In this table, we store information of end-entityProfiles
existent in the EJBCA. We also use this table information to make EJBCA
requests.
Table Operations This table contains all the API operations. The opName field
contains the name of the operation, that is used to make requests to the API.
Table LoginSession This table is for storing information about end-entities session’s
information and to store the certificate used by the end-entity to authenticate
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Figure 3.2: Backend Database EER Database Diagram
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with our services. As our login process uses strong authentication using public
key certificates, with a challenge-signature method, is necessary to store the
certificate to verify the signed challenge. It also stores the session ID given to
end-entities after them conclude the authentication process.
Table Certificates In this table will be inserted information about the issued cer-
tificates. It also stores the ID of the end-entity whose certificate belongs, the
profile ID used to make the request and the dates between the certificate is valid.
This could be useful to get information such as which certificates are about to
expire or how many certificates a end-entity have.
Profile This is a very important table. This table aggregates several necessary
information to make requests to EJBCA, they are being a combination between
a CA, an EJBCA certificateProfile, an EJBCA end-entityProfile and an EJBCA
end-entity. Each of these combinations forms one of our backend database
profiles, and each one of these combinations is named in a field called profileName
which is the profile name. When the end-entities want to make a certificate
request, the end-entities must make a request containing a profileName. So the
profileName information could be in the end-entities software or the end-entities
can retrieve that information by making an API call to get all the profile names
that the end-entity have access. We created this to facilitate how end-entities
make a certificate request. In EJBCA, to make a certificate request, we need
information such as the issuing CA, an EJBCA certificateProfile, an EJBCA end-
entityProfile and an EJBCA end-entity. With this table, we simplify the process
for end-entities, that, instead of needing to know the four fields mentioned,
they pass to only need to know one field. Beyond aggregate data to make
EJBCA certificate requests, these profiles are also related with an access control
mechanism. End-entities have access profiles and profiles have permissions to
execute operations. So, a profile is also a group of end-entities, and this group
of end-entities should have the same role in the PKI. With this we can create
a set of classes of end-entities that can perform a set of operations with the
most varied set of EJBCA certificateProfiles, EJBCA end-entityProfiles and CAs.
This allows a highly configurable and scalable set of rules to end-entities perform
operations. However, before we fill this table, we need a lot of planning. It is
needed to create all the CAs, all the EJBCA certificateProfiles, EJBCA end-
entityrofiles and EJBCA end-entities first, then pass that information to this
and the related tables. Finally, we have to assign permissions to the profiles,
and define as well, which end-entities have access to which profiles.
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Users This table is used to save information about users. In the Figure 3.2, the table
Users have a lot of fields from the DN, but these fields can be changed according
to a specific case. One specificity of this table is that the username field will not
be a common username chosen by the end-entity, but the serialNumber from the
subject DN of the administrative certificate used in the authentication process.
The serialNumber should be a unique identifier of the security elements delivered
to the end-entities.
Groups This table is used to save which profiles an end-entity with an administrative
certificate issued by a determined administrative CA have access to. So, when
an end-entity is created in our backend database, it is given a set of permissions
that is stored in the Group Profile table. So, we must have as many groups as
administrative CAs.
RenewRequests, Pkcs10Requests and RevokeRequests Tables These tables will
be information about requests made by end-entities. End-entities can make
operation requests, and then an administrator with permissions to that, can
approve or deny those requests. When the administrator decides to approve or
deny a request, this information is also saved in these tables as well who made
that decision, when it was made and what the decision was. End-entities cannot
do duplicated requests, but they can cancel any requests they made and make
a new one, when a decision about the first request was not made yet.
3.2.2 API
PKIs and all the involved components and operations can be a little tricky for unexpe-
rienced users. With this work we intend to facilitate the PKI management joining all
the public PKI components in one only place. In the developed web services we provide
functions to perform PKI operations related to the RA, the VA and the Publisher. Our
API allows end-entities to interact with our services. We created API calls to allow all
necessary operations. The API follows an RPC style, where we have used URL query
strings to pass the API calls parameters to the server and the answers are all made
with a defined JSON structures. The only operation that was not implemented, and
is very common in several PKIs, is the key recovery/archival . We did not implement
a key recovery/archival operation because, as we only use cryptographic tokens to
generate the end-entities keypairs, in which the private keys are not exportable, that
function was unnecessary. We will now describe the operations we implemented in the
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API, on the server side, and analyze how we implemented them. All the API calls
connections are encrypted using HTTPS connections.
3.2.2.1 Login
The login operation follows the workflow presented in Figure 3.3. The Login operation
is necessary to end-entities make all requests that need authentication. The operations
that need authentication are identified in the Appendix API Documentation.
Figure 3.3: Login Operation Workflow
We will now explain each step of the operation designed in Figure 3.3:
1 The first step consists on the end-entity makes a login request to the API. The
end-entity needs to send the administrative certificate that was given to him
with the cryptographic token.
2 When the API receives a login request, it will check if the certificate received is
still valid and if was issued by one of the infrastructure administrative CAs. If it
was, then we extract the serialNumber field from subject DN. This serialNumber
is used as username. Then we check if the user name already exists. If it does
not exist, we create a new user in the Users Table, we give access to the Profiles
in the Table ”Users Profile”, according to the administrative CA of the given
certificate. That permissions set is stored in the ”Groups Profile” Table. After
the user is created, or if it already existed, then we move to the authentication
process. The process consists in challenge-signature mechanism. So, when we
receive the certificate, we store it in the database, in the Table ”LoginSession”,
create a random challenge string and send it back to the end-entity.
3 and 4 The user receives the challenge from the API, signs the challenge with his
private key corresponding to the sent certificate, and send the signed challenge
to the API.
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5 After receiving the signed challenge from the end-entity, we get the certificate and
the original challenge from the database. We check if the signed challenge
matches with the public key in the administrative certificate. If so, we generate
a session token, which is a random string, and we store it in the database.
6 Finally the API sends the session token to the end-entity, and then it can use this
token to do other operations that requires authentication, such as a certificate
request.
After login, end-entities are able to try to perform all operations. We will now analyze
how we implemented those operations. We said try to perform because, if the end-
entity does not have the necessary permissions to do them, they will receive an error
message with an unauthorized operation message.
3.2.2.2 Certificate Request
The Certificate Request operation follows the workflow presented in Figure 3.4. We
will now explain each step:
Figure 3.4: Certificate Request Workflow
1 First, the end-entity needs to send to the API a CSR in PKCS#10 format, the
session token given after the login, and the profile. The CSR must contain the
subject DN from the end-entity, and that subject DN will be used as subject
DN in the new issued certificate. This subject DN must have all the DN fields
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required in the EJBCA end-entityProfile requested, but, if it does not fulfill those
requirements, an error message is returned.
2 The API receives the certificate request alongside with the CSR, the profile and the
session token. Before do any operation, the API checks several permissions:
• Checks if the session token is valid and if it was given to the requester
end-entity.
• Verifies if the end-entity have access to the profile requested.
• Verifies if the profile requested have permissions to issue certificates.
• Checks if the end-entity already issued any certificate from the profile
requested. If so, the request is denied. If the certificate is still valid, the
end-entity does not need another certificate with the same profile. If it had
one certificate and it was revoked, and a new certificate request is made,
a manual verification should be used to mitigate the revoke reason and if
the new certificate request is legit. If, for example, an employee no longer
works in a company, and if he tries to issue a new certificate, that could be
a security problem. In these cases, the end-entities could make a certificate
request for an administrator approve. Of course we can find cases where
is useful we have an end-entity issue certificates from the same profile,
however we followed the one limited approach. In the future, a mechanism
that enables multi certificates from the same profile could be implemented.
Only after those verifications are made, the API will make the certificate re-
quest to EJBCA. For that the API needs to fetch from the backend database,
information related to the profile requested, in order to make the request to
EJBCA.
3 EJBCA will analyze if the received certificate request does not have any problem,
such as if the subject DN requested fit the EJBCA end-entityProfile, and if so,
it will issue a new certificate, sign it and send the it to the API.
4 The API receives the certificate from EJBCA.
5 Before delivering the certificate to the end-entity, the API will store, in the backend
database, information about the new issued certificate, such as the validity
timestamps, the end-entity who issued it and the subject DN.
6 Finally the API delivers the new issued certificate to the end-entity.
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3.2.2.3 Certificate Renew Request
The certificate renew request is very similar to the certificate request process. We
could have two variants. One of them, wherein the same keys are used and the variant
where new keys are used. However, we chose that we always will renew certificates
with a new keypair. The renew request should be made close to the certificate validity
end. We make some different verifications when a certificate renew request is made.
The end-entity needs to send a new CSR where the subject DN must be the same
as the old certificate, the profile and the serial number of the certificate that will be
renewed. If EJBCA issue a new certificate successfully, the old certificate is revoked
and the new certificate is returned to the end-entity.
3.2.2.4 Get Crl
For an end-entity get a CRL, it needs to make a request to the API indicating from
each CA it wants to receive the CRL. This operation does not need authentication.
So, when the API receives the CRL request, the API check in the backend database,
in the CAs table, if the CRL present is still fresh. If the CRL from the database is
fresh, then the API sends it to the end-entity. If not, the API requests EJBCA to
issue a new one, then retrieve the new CRL and stores it in the backend database.
We store the CRLs in the backend database to avoid access EJBCA to fetch a CRL
that already was fetched.
3.2.2.5 OCSP Query
We also created an API call for getting the state of a certificate. The end-entity simply
needs to send the certificate serial number and issuing CA of the certificate which it
wants to know the state. The API receives the request and before asking EJBCA the
certificate status, it checks in the backend database if there are some certificate issued
with the serial number and CA provided. If not, the API immediately answers to
the end-entity that there are no certificate with the specified serial number, so status
unknown. We added this function because, in EJBCA, during the installation process,
we can choose how EJBCA should handle the unknown certificate status, and the
option ”Non existing is good” is available. So, we decided to pass the responsibility of
answers unknown certificate status to our API, safeguarding any of the options chosen
in the EJBCA installation. When the certificate exists we ask EJBCA the state of
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the certificate, and if the certificate is valid he just tells the user that the certificate is
still valid, but if the certificate was revoked we send the revoked status accompanied
by the reason why the certificate was revoked and when it was revoked.
3.2.2.6 Submit Requests for Approval
This is a set of operations that allows the creation of requests in order to fulfill some
operations. The idea is to permit a non automatic way to do the certificate revoke,
issue and renew operations. It is necessary an approval to complete the requests. So,
when the end-entities do not have permissions to do the above operations, they could
submit a request in order to fulfill them. After, an end-entity with permissions, which
we can call an administrator, can accept or deny those requests. The end-entity that
made the request can also cancel the request if a decision about the request was not
made yet.
So, when a end-entity submit a request for approval, it needs to send all the information
that is sent such as if it was a normal request. The data sent is stored in the backend
database. The end-entity can see which requests it made and still are waiting for a
decision, as well the result of requests that a decision was already made.
The administrator, can retrieve the requests from all users. He can accept or deny
those requests. It is saved in the database what the decision was, when it was made
and who made it.
So, if a request is denied, the information about the decision is stored in the database
and the process is done. But if the decision is positive, we still need to proceed to
the execution of the request. So we retrieve the information stored in the backend
database, that was sent by the end-entity when it submitted the request. After we
proceed to the fulfillment of the operation. However, in cases of issue or renew requests,
where the end-entity should receive the certificate, the user end-entity is not waiting
to receive the certificate. So, the end-entity, after the decision was made, can get the
certificates using the API call getUserCertificate.
3.2.2.7 Get CAs Chain or Certificates
We provided API calls in order to end-entities get CAs certificates or the whole
certification path from a CA. These operations do not need authentication. The
end-entities send the request to the API and the API make the request to EJBCA
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that answers back to the API and this to the end-entity.
3.2.2.8 Get users certificates
It is possible to get end-entities certificates. We can get end-entity certificates by his
subject DN or by a certificate serial number.
3.2.3 Technologies Used
During the implementation of our API and the infrastructure that we create in order
to fulfill our objectives, we used a lot of established technologies. We now describe
which ones we used, and what we used them for.
EJBCA and EJBCA WebServices As explained in the State of Art chapter, EJBCA
is a CA software, built using Java Enterprise Edition (JEE). As also explained
above, EJBCA provide JAX-WS 2.0 Web Service Interface that can access the
basic functions remotely over client authenticated HTTPS. We used the version
6 2 0.
JBoss The EJBCA software runs on an application server. We chose to use JBoss
7.1.1.GA version because it was the one that is used in the EJBCA installation
tutorials.
Apache Tomcat Apache Tomcat is an open source software implementation of the
Java Servlet, JavaServer Pages, Java Expression Language and Java WebSocket
technologies. We used it to provide our API.
MySQL and MySQL Connector MySQL is an open-source relational database
management system (RDBMS). MySQL Connector offers a standard database
driver connectivity for using MySQL with applications and tools. We used them
both in the EJBCA Database and in the Backend Database.
JAVA JAVA is a general-purpose, concurrent, class-based, object-oriented computer
programming language. We use JAVA, version 7 to build our API.
Maven Apache Maven is a software project management and comprehension tool.
Maven can manage a project’s build, reporting and documentation from a central
piece of information. We use Maven to manage the external libraries used and
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to deploy the project and build the WAR file, that is deployed in the Tomcat
server.
IntelliJ IDEA IntelliJ IDEA is a Java integrated development environment (IDE)
for developing computer software. We use IntelliJ IDEA to program our API
and a simple API client used for testing.
Log4j Log4j is a Java-based logging utility. We use it to create logs of all performed
operations.
JSON JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) is a lightweight data-interchange format.
All the answers from the API calls as well the exceptions returned via JSON
messages.
Bouncy Castle Crypto APIs Bouncy Castle is a collection of APIs used in cryp-
tography. It includes APIs for both the Java and the C# programming lan-
guages. We used the Bouncy Castle APIs in our API to do cryptographic
operations.
Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM) KVM is a full virtualization solution for Linux.
It consists of a loadable kernel module that provides the core virtualization
infrastructure and a processor module. We used the KVM virtualization tech-
nologies to create our infrastructure.
3.2.4 Client Software
The API is not a friendly interface. So a client software is useful to interact with
the API, simplifying those interactions. We have created a client software to interact
with the API. This client software allows the end-entities invoke the API in order
to perform the desired operations. With this client software, end-entities can easily
automate interactions with our services. We used this client software to test if the
API was answering as expected to the various requests. The client was created using
JAVA and we used the following technologies to help to the client development:
• Apache HttpComponents to help us make HTTPS connections to the API.
• Bouncy Castle Crypto APIs to make cryptographic operations.
• Maven To manage the external libraries.
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• JSON to decode the messages received from the API.
In the implemented client software, we created an Interface with several methods,
one for each of the API possible operations. These methods take arguments, that
are mostly system paths to files or strings. For example, for the login operation, we
need to provide the administrative certificate path and the private key path in order to
fulfill the operation. The API calls needs other arguments, but they are extracted from
the provided files, or are treated inside the client. The certificates and cryptographic
keypairs should be inside the cryptographic tokens, but, as we did not treat that part
of our proposed infrastructure in this thesis, we used normal operating systems to
save certificates and cryptographic keypairs. This client should be adapted in order
to communicate with the secure elements. The available functions are described in
the Appendix Client Software Documentation. We need to set the client truststore.
We can chose the system truststore, or create a new one and set the new truststore in
the client. With this approach, we do not need to add CAs to the system truststore,
which can be an advantage. Anyway, we got to have the ROOT CA certificate in the
selected truststore. It is very simple to use this client software in order to program a
set of instructions to automatically get all the certificates an end-entity have access.
The following code snippet is an example of how simple is to get all certificates an
end-entity have access:
APITalker apiTalker = ClientFunctions.getInstance();
apiTalker.login(administrativeCertificatePath, privateKeyPath);
JSONObject jsonAnwser =
apiTalker.getAvailableProfiles(administrativeCertificatePath);
String type = jsonAnwser.getString("type");
JSONArray availableProfiles = (JSONArray) jsonAnwser.get(type);
for (int i = 0 ; i < availableProfiles.length(); i++){
apiTalker.getNewCertificate(administrativeCertificatePath, csrPath,
availableProfiles.getString(i), destinyPath );
}
Of course that this is a simplistic approach, where we do not take into account possible
exceptions that may occur. In the following code snippet we check if a certificate with
a given serial number is valid:
CHAPTER 3. IMPLEMENTATION 56
APITalker apiTalker = ClientFunctions.getInstance();
JSONObject jsonAnwser =
apiTalker.checkCertificateValidaty(serialNumber,issuerCA);
JSONObject jsonFinalAnwser = null;
try{
jsonFinalAnwser = (JSONObject) jsonAnwser.get("ocspAnswer");
}
catch (JSONException e){
System.out.println((jsonAnwser.getString("type")));
System.out.println(jsonAnwser.getString("code"));
System.out.println(jsonAnwser.getString("description"));
System.exit(1);
}
It is possible to simplify the implemented methods. For example, we could adapt
the checkCertificateValidaty method, and turn it into an boolean method, hiding even
more the complexity of dealing with the JSON structures.
Chapter 4
Practical Use Case
In this chapter we present a possible implementation of a PKI using our proposed
architecture applied to the context of University of Porto (UP). We also present the
relevant work necessary to set up the API.
4.1 University of Porto Case Practice
First, we will introduce the University of Porto and some infrastructures that UP have
which we can integrate in our proposed PKI architecture.
4.1.1 University of Porto
The University of Porto is a Portuguese public university located in Porto, Portugal. It
was founded in 22 March 1911 and currently is the second largest Portuguese university
in terms of number of students. Currently UP houses 32000 students, 2400 teachers
and researchers along with 1,600 administrative staff. UP is currently formed by 14
faculties and a business school offering a variety of courses, covering the whole range
of study areas and all levels of higher education [24]. Despite its size and number of
members, UP does not own a PKI. It only introduced digital signature operations in
2013/14, only in the processes of international mobility students using the Portuguese
Citizen Card [23]. However the Portuguese Citizen Card does not authenticate the
role that the signer have inside the UP organization.
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4.1.1.1 U.Porto Card
The U. Porto Card, was introduced in 2008 and results from a partnership between
the University and Banco Santander Totta. It is a smartcard integrating different
technologies, contact and contactless, which currently gathers several functionalities:
[25]
Figure 4.1: U.Porto Card [25]
Identification It identifies students and contributors as members of the U. Porto
academic community.
Access Control Allows access to internal services within the various organic units
like library loans or university’s buildings access control.
Third Party Services Access to other services provided by third parties, under
special terms.
The smartcard was developed by Gemalto and belongs to Optelio Contactless D32
R5 smartcards family. Beyond the capabilities harnessed by UP, the smartcard also
features a cryptographic coprocessor for public key encryption and Dynamic Data
Authentication (DDA), contains a 32k EEPROM memory available for applications
and data. The smartcard also has some applets such as PayPass M/Chip4 developed
by Mastercard or VSDC2.7.1 developed by Visa among others, but the one that
interests us is Classic IAS V3 (GemSAFE) which is a PKCS#11 PKI application
that allows cryptographic operations such as digital signature, strong authentication
and certificate storage. This applet follows the PKCS#15 Standard and all PKIs that
uses PKCS#11 APIs can be used with this applet [44].
Concluding, the UP Card is capable of generating cryptographic key pairs and storing
certificates. In our proposed architecture, the clients should have a cryptographic
token or smartcard and the UP Card is ideal for that role. So the idea, in this practical
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use case, is to use the UP Card as the end-entity cryptographic token. However, in
our work, we did not develop the cryptographic provider for the UP smartcard.
4.2 Setting up EJBCA
We will now explain all the steps to deploy a complete installation of our architecture.
As said in the State of the Art Chapter, EJBCA is a software that runs on an
application server. We choose JBoss 7.1.1. EJBCA also needs a relational database
management system and we choose MySQL for that role. First, we need to configure
JBoss to properly interact with MySQL. After that, we follow two different sets of
instructions, that complements each other, to complete the installation of EJBCA.
Those instructions are available here [32] and here [18]. In the EJBCA installation,
we need to configure a set of files in the EJBCA conf/ directory, where we can make
various configurations, such as the initial CA, the default algorithms to use, configure
the access to the database and some of passwords to be used in the service, but we
will not enter into details in this part. The configuration files available, that we can
edit to configure EJBCA can be viewed in Figure 4.2
Figure 4.2: List of EJBCA configuration files
After the installation is concluded, we need to use the superadmin user to access
EJBCA administration page. The superadmin user is an EJBCA user created during
the EJBCA installation that have access to the EJBCA administration Web page.
To access the EJBCA administration page, it is necessary to import the superadmin
certificate to the browser where we will access the administration Web page. The
CHAPTER 4. PRACTICAL USE CASE 60
superadmin certificate and private key are generated during the installation process
in a keystore protected with a password defined in one of the EJBCA configuration
files. Once we have access to the EJBCA administration Web page, we need to create
and configure the following components:
CA Infrastructure The first thing we need to create is the CA infrastructure. We
decided to create a three tier hierarchal CA infrastructure in this particular
practical use case. In the Figure 4.3 we can see the proposed infrastructure.
We have a single ROOT CA, called UPROOTCA. The ROOT CA will sign two
sub-CAs. One of them, will sign the administrative CAs, and the other one
will sign the operational CAs. The operational CAs are the CAs responsible to
issue the operational certificates. So we created eight issuing CAs. Four of them
are administrative CAs for students, staff, teachers and administrators. The
other four CAs, also for students, staff, teachers and administrators, but for the
operational certificates.
Figure 4.3: CAs infrastructure created for UP
When we are creating a CA in EJBCA, we can define several configurations
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such as the signing algorithm, the subject DN, validity, if is a ROOT CA or if is
sub-CA. We can also define CRL specific data such as the default CRL issuer,
the CRL expiration period or the default OCSP service location.
CertificateProfiles After creating all the CAs, we also need to create the EJBCA
certificateProfiles. We already have some pre-defined certificateProfiles that we
can use as templates for new certificateProfiles. The templates available are, for
example, Enduser, RootCA or SubCA. We created our certificateProfiles based
on the Enduser certificateProfile. We created eight different certificate profiles.
Four of them for the administrative certificates and the other four are for the
operational certificates. In here, we can also define the certificate Key Usage,
Extended Key Usage and other X.509v3 certificate extensions. We decided to
create certificateProfiles that enable us to perform digital signature operations.
We created four different certificateProfiles for each of the end-entities classes,
because we can predefine fields such as available CAs, what can prevent, for
example, that a student issue a certificate from the teachers CA.
End-EntityProfiles Posteriorly, it is also necessary to create the end-entityProfiles.
In this case, we do not have any templates to facilitate our jobs. But after
the creation of the first end-entityProfile, we can use it as a template to create
new profiles. In this step, we can define which DN fields will be present in the
further issued certificates. In this case, we though the following fields would
be recommended to undoubtedly identify a person inside and outside the UP
infrastructure:
• CN That would be the name of the entity.
• O This field should always be UP.
• OU The Organizational Unit fields would identify the organic unit or
faculty in UP.
• L The location of the entity.
• ST To identify the state of the end-entity.
• C The country of the end-entity
• emailAddress For the UP institutional email address.
• UID The unique identifier would be used for the unique personal number
in UP
• Title This field would identify the role of the entity inside the UP infras-
tructure.
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• serialNumber The smartcard RFID.
We defined eight different it end-entityProfiles, where we predefined some fields
in DN, such as UP as Organization for all profiles. We defined the Title field
according to the end-entity role, so student, staff, teacher or administrator. We
can also define the CAs and certificateProfiles, the end-entityProfiles can use,
define the along with some other configurations.
EJBCA End-Entities EJBCA have end-entities and our Backend Database have
end-entities. If we used these two end-entities management mechanisms, it would
lead to a duplication of end-entities. However, both are necessary, because, for
example, to make a certificate request to EJBCA, it is necessary to use an
EJBCA end-entity make the request. The easiest solution would be at the same
time as we create an end-entity in our Backend Database, we create an equal
end-entity in EJBCA, but this would lead to a duplication of end-entities in the
two platforms. A solution that was thought and successfully implemented was
the creation of a single end-entity in EJBCA and associate this end-entity with
only one CA in EJBCA. Thus, all the certificates issued by one CA would belong
to the same EJBCA end-entity, and in the Backend Database we could see which
certificates belong to each real end-entity, since we safeguard that information
in the Backend Database. With this approach, we cannot use some EJBCA WS
functions, such as the revoke user function where all the certificates from an
end-entity are revoked. However, we can emulate the majority of functions we
cannot perform using our backend database. In the PKI planning, it is necessary
to decide what options is the best to the given case.
this operation still can be done using the Backend Database, where we would
need to fetch all the certificates from an end-entity and then revoke them one
by one. With this, we finish the necessary EJBCA configurations.
4.3 Preparing the Backend Database
After configure EJBCA, we also have to fill some tables in the Backend Database, as
said in the Backend Database section. Actually, this step is manually made, but in
the future, we can make a simple script that reads the relevant information from the
EJBCA database and then fill the Backend Database. The tables that are need to fill
and with what are:
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• CAs With all the CAs that we created.
• CertificateProfile With all the EJBCA certificateProfiles created in EJBCA.
• end-entity Profiles With all the EJBCA end-entityProfiles created in EJBCA.
• Profile With the profiles that we think that would be necessary. As said before,
this Profile Table is a junction between a CA, an EJBCA certificate profile, an
EJBCA end-entityProfile and an EJBCA end-entity. We created eight different
profiles according to the end-entity role, four for the administrative CAs and
four for the operational CAs .
• Operations To be filled with all the operations that the API provides.
• ProfileOperations We need to fill this table to give Profiles access to opera-
tions. In our case we give all the privileges to administrators. Then the students,
teachers and staff would have the same set of permissions. They would have
access to issue the first certificate for each Profile they have access.
• Groups We need to fill this table with what we call groups. A group is associated
with an administrative CA and defines a class of end-entities.
• Group Profiles In this table, we set which Profiles, the end-entities from a
group has access to. It will be based on this table that the Users Profiles Table
will be filled, when a new end-entity is created.
After filling all the described Tables, the Backend Database is ready, and the service
is able to start. All the other tables will be filled as soon as the end-entities start to
interact with the API.
4.3.1 End-entities Client Software
We can use the implemented client software to implement a new client software where
we can define a workflow that can work in several manners. We could implement
a client software where end-entities had to manually make request for certificates,
or we can make a client software implementation where end-entities only need to
insert the UP smartcard and press a button and the card would be provisioned with
the certificates the end-entity has access to. The PKI administrator has to decide
how he wants to implement the client. We provide an API and architecture that
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are customizable, scalable, with customizable access control, allows certificate auto
enrollment and a client that he can use to implement automatic operations.
4.3.1.1 Proposed end-entity Client Software Workflow
We propose an end-entity client software workflow to securely and automatically
provision the UP smartcards with certificates. The proposed solution, can be seen
in Figure 4.4.
The first and second step is the Login with our API and then get the end-entity
available profiles. Then it is checked if the end-entity already have in their possession
and the certificates matching the available profiles and if they are still valid. If
the end-entity does not have certificates that matches the available profiles, or the
owned certificates are invalid a certificate request is made. In this solution we allow
automatic certificate provisioning, but, if for some reason, the certificate request be
synchronously rejected by the API, we automatically submit a certificate request for
an administrator approval. However, before submit such request, it first checks if there
are equivalent active requests, and if so, it does not submit another request to avoid
duplicate requests. Before make any certificate request, the client software also checks
if the end-entity have valid certificates in the certificate repository, corresponding to
the wanted profile, which may result from a certificate request previously submitted
and was already approved, avoiding unnecessary requests. A similar mechanism exist
to certificate renewals. When this process ends, the end-entity is able to perform
operations with the owned certificates.
CHAPTER 4. PRACTICAL USE CASE 65
Figure 4.4: End-entities proposed Software Workflow Flowchart
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we made a literature study on the matters of cryptography and PKI,
more specifically in a way to enable a secure and automatic way to issue X.509
certificates. We have studied the basics of cryptography, PKI, PKI software solu-
tions, services communication, PKI services through web services and certificate auto
enrollment protocols. After the literature study, we took advantage of study made
and we collected the good ideas from the solutions and protocols we presented in
the State of the Art chapter. We also used already existing software like EJBCA
and the EJBCA Web Services API to construct our architecture as explained in
Implementation chapter.
We think that our certificate auto enrollment protocol, relatively to SCEP and ACME
is more configurable, scalable and embracing, allowing to apply our solution to very
different PKI application ends. As we have the API, we can build different client
software approaches in order to achieve different PKI implementations. We can have
certificates auto enrollment, asynchronously certificate enrollment, and provide a large
specter of certificates to large scale groups of end-entities.
5.1 Implementation limitations
In the solution that we developed, we did not take into account any problems like
server load balancing and high availability, however, these problems should be taken
into account if we want this to be more than a prototype.
The security of our solution depends one the correct delivery of the initialized secure
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elements. After that process is complete, the process is quite automatic, secure and
simple. However the necessity to physically send the token, for example to a new client,
turns the process a bit slow to some business models, due to geographic distances.
5.2 Future Work
The proposed architecture is a highly scalable, configurable and relatively simple to
understand. There are some points where we think that can be improved in the future.
Extend the API We would like to extend the API to create more operational func-
tions. The end-entities management is a point which needs some improvement.
The Dogtag Certificate System has a good end-entities functionalities deployed
and we would like to improve our API to enable such operations.
Secure elements re-configuration With this, we mean change the administrative
certificate in the cryptographic token already in use. If we want to change the
class of end-entities to another class of end entities to receive different certificates
and permissions, we have two options. Or we manually set those permissions
in the Backend Database and then the end-entity would have access to the new
profiles, or we could replace the administrative certificate in the cryptographic
token. The end-entity, in our backend database would be the same, since the
cryptographic token was not replaced. We only need to add procedures to clear
the old permissions in the backend database. With this, we are trying to avoid
the need to physically change the cryptographic token, when we want to change
the end-entity class of an already existing end-entity. This operation can be
achieved with the current existing API operations. All we need is to define how
this operation should be done.
Creation of a graphical user interface (GUI) Although is not strictly necessary,
a GUI in a standalone application or in a Web page would help the PKI man-
agement. The GUI should be built to facilitate data visualization, wherein it
would be more useful for an administrator than to a simple end-entity. It would
help to better visualize, for example, the end-entity requests, and could select
several requests to approve or deny at the same time.
Improve messages security In the future, if we conclude that the actual messages
exchange between the API and the end-entities is not secure enough, then we will
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then create an extra security mechanism. If an attacker, somehow could steel
the session token that we provide, we could impersonate the stolen end-entity.
So, if before we send a message to the API, we create an hash of the message,
sign it with the administrative certificate correspondent private key and send
this signed hash together with the original message, we avoid that an attacker
could impersonate the end entity.
5.3 Conclusion
In this thesis, we addressed the problem of providing X.509 certificates in an automatic
and secure way in large scale infrastructures using web services. We presented a
solution, that solves the proposed problem and we included it in a PKI infrastructure
in order to present a full PKI solution with a possibility of end-entities certificates auto
enrollment. For that, we used several already existing softwares like EJBCA and built
our solution on top of that existing and proved softwares. We consider that our solution
is secure, scalable, highly customizable and simple to understand and deploy, after the
initial configuration. The initial configuration that is necessary in order to deploy our
solution is a bit more complex and should be done by an experienced user, both in PKI
and the used software in our solution, to guarantee that the infrastructure is correctly
implemented. After that, we think that a person without suck PKI knowledge can
understand how to work with our solution, so making PKI more desirable to entities
without the knowledge about how to implement and manage PKIs. However, we must
admit that our solution is not perfect. Security flaws may exist, and our proposed
solution is not ideal to very large scales, or geographically distant and disperse end-
entities due the need to deliver the secure elements. The need to initially provide
cryptographic tokens to the end-entities are possible, but the work load necessary to
deploy such service in a very large scale is very difficult. In small, medium and minor
big infrastructures we think that a solution is quite suitable to deploy a quality PKI
service. Although we think that the software is capable of supporting such a large
scale service we can not ignore that the physical limitations turns the implementation
not impossible but unappetizing. SCEP still a better solution to really large scale
infrastructures, but we think that the protocol should be improved in order to correct
the identified flaws. ACME is and the Let’s Encrypt Initiative is a very good solution,
that we think that will revolutionize the way we surf the Internet turning it really
more secure. However, as we have already said, it only covers a bit of possible PKI end
application. We consider that we reached all the objectives proposed in the beginning
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 69
of this thesis, providing a secure and automatic way to issue certificates for entities,
an infrastructure to support a fully functional PKI, a framework architecture for PKI
backoffice services and a data model for end-entity interactions with the backoffice
PKI services.
Appendix A
API
A.1 API Code Organization
In order to organize the code we divided the code in five different Java packages and
several Classes. We divided the code in packages according with which infrastructure
elements the code will interact. Inside each package, we also divided the code according
to which PKI common operations the code will deal. The code is organized in the
following order packages and classes:
frontend In the frontend package we have the Java servlet responsible to listen all
the requests from users and administrators. It also will have several classes that
will treat the users requests. These classes are organized according to the PKI
operations:
MainServlet The MainServlet is a Java Servlet responsible for receiving all
requests from end-entities. Then, according the requested operation, it
forwards the request to one of the other classes from this package after
make some verifications.
FeOperator In this class we defined methods to deal with the end-entities login
process.
FeIssuer In this class there are defined methods to deal with the certificates
issuance and renewing.
FeRevoker This class deals with certificate revoke operations.
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FeValidator FeValidator class contains methods to check the certificate’s status
through OCSP and CRLs.
FePublisher In this class, we deal with the Publisher common operations.
dbfrontend In this package there are classes that interact with the backend database.
The classes of other packages do not directly access the database. We have the
following classes:
DbCommons In this class there are the necessary methods to connect to
the database and some common methods with queries used by several
operations.
DbCertRequest In this class there are methods that deal with new certificates
issuance.
DbFeCertRenewal In this class there are methods that deal with certificate
renewals.
DbFeCertRevoke In this class we deal with certificate revoke operations.
DbFeLogin In this class we deal with end-entities session informations.
DbFeGetCRL In this class there are methods to deal with the CRL operations
backend In this package there are classes that communicate with the CA, so, the
EJBCA software. All the communication pass through a SSL/TLS connection
that uses strong authentication. The classes in this package use the EJBCA
Web Services Interface provided by EJBCA.
utilities In this packages we define some objects in order to save end-entities requests.
We also have a class with a lot of methods that are commonly used.
exceptions For code organization reasons, we created a package to put all the created
exceptions.
A.2 API Documentation
The functionality currently available in our API is documented in this Appendix. The
format and the parameters of the requests that can be made to the server, the format
of the server answers and the error messages, are specified in this document.
login1
Description Login with challenge-signature verification step 1.
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any User
Arguments
'operation' : 'login1'                                   
'certificate' : certificatePEMString                              //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   //awnser timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                'type' : 'challenge',
                'challenge' : JSON { 
                            'chalange' : StringChalenge               //String
                            'loginID' : loginID                                  //String, 
                 }
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   //awnser timestamp
          'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
login2
Description Login with challenge-signature verification step 2.
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any User
Arguments
'operation' : 'login2'                                   
'signedChallenge' : signedChallenge              //String
'loginID' loginID                                                     //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                     //timestamp
          'OK' :  JSON{
                'type' : 'sessionID',
                'sessionID' : sessionToken               //String   
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
logout
Description Exit Session
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any User
Arguments
'operation' : 'logout'                                   
'sessionID' : sessionID                                                                            //String
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                                         //timestamp
          'OK' : JSON{
                'type' : 'ack',
                'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                                    //awnser timestamp
            'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                                 //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription                      //String
          }
}       
ocspQuery
Description Query the state of a certificate 
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Any User
Arguments
'operation' : 'ocspQuery'                                   
'serialNumber' : serialNumber                    //String
'issuerCA' : issuerCA                                       //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                    //timestamp
            'OK' : JSON{
                'status' : {'good' | 'revoked'},
                'reason' : reason,                                //String
                'date'  : revoikeDate                         //timestamp 
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                  //awnser timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
getCrl
Description Get the last CRL from the specified CA
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Any User
Arguments
'operation' : 'getCrl'                                   
'ca' :  CertificateAuthorityCNinDN                   //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                     //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                       'type' : 'base64Crl',
                        'base64Crl' : base64Crl             //base64String   
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
revokeCertificateRequest
Description Revoke an certificate with the specified serial Number
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Authenticated User with this operation privelegies
Arguments
'operation' : 'revokeCertificateRequest' 
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String
'profile' : profile                                                                                      //String 
'serialNumber' :  serialNumber                                                          //String
'issurCA' : issuerCACN                                                                           //String
'revokeReason' : revokeReason                                                        //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
revokeCertificateRequestSubmission
Description Save a request for aproval to revoke an certificate with the specified serial Number
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'revokeCertificateRequestSubmission'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                                    
'serialNumber' :  serialNumber                                                         //String
'issuerCA' : issuerCACN                                                                       //String
'revokeReason' : revokeReason                                                       //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
getRevokeCertificateRequests
Description Gets all revoke certificates requests  made by given user
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'getRevokeCertificateRequests'                                   
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String 
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : {
                         'type' : 'revokeRequests',
                         'revokeRequests' : [{'reason':reason,'issuerCA':issuerCA,'user':user, 
'serialNumber':serialNumber, 'idRequest': idRequest},{....}]
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
getAllRevokeCertificateRequests
Description Gets all revoke certificates requests made by all users
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Authenticated User with this operation privelegies
Arguments
'operation' : 'getAllRevokeCertificateRequests'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String 
'profile' : profile                                                                                      //String                  
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                                        //timestamp
             'OK' : {
                         'type' : 'revokeRequests',
                         'revokeRequests' : [{'reason':reason,'issuerCA':issuerCA,'user':user, 
'serialNumber':serialNumber, 'idRequest': idRequest},{....}]
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
aproveRevokeCertificateRequest
Description Aprove the revokeRequest, made by someuser, with the given ID if a decision wasn't made yet
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Authenticated User with this operation privelegies
Arguments
'operation' : 'aproveRevokeCertificateRequest'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                  
'idRequest' : idRequest                                                                       //String 
'profile' : profile                                                                                     //String 
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }}       
denyRevokeCertificateRequest
Description Deny the revokeRequest, made by some user, with the given ID if a decision wasn't made yet
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Authenticated User with this operation privelegies
Arguments
'operation' : 'cancelRevokeCertificateRequest'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                  
'idRequest' : idRequest                                                                       //String
'profile' : profile                                                                                      //String  
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
cancelRevokeCertificateRequest
Description Deny the revokeRequest, made by same user, with the given ID if a decision wasn't made yet
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'cancelOwnRevokeCertificateRequest'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                  
'idRequest' : idRequest                                                                       //String  
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
pkcs10Request
Description Create a new certificate from the given csr for the profile given
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Authenticated User with this operation privelegies
Arguments
'operation' : 'pkcs10Request' 
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String
'pkcs10' :  pkcs10                                                                                    //Base64 Csr String with 
Headers
'profile' : profile                                                                                     //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'certificate',
                         'certificate' : certificate     //Base64 Csr String without Headers          
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
pkcs10RequestSubmission
Description Save a request for  an pkcs10 Request with the specified profile and user
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'pkcs10RequestSubmission'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                                   
'pkcs10' :  pkcs10                                                                                    //Base64CsrString
'profile' : profile                                                                                     //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }  }       
getPkcs10RequestSubmissions
Description Gets all pkcs10 requests made by given user
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'getPkcs10RequestSubmissions'                                   
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String 
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : {
                         'type' : 'Pkcs10Requests',
                         'Pkcs10Requests' : [Pkcs10Request{'profile':profile,'csr':icsr,'user':user, 'idRequest':
idRequest},Pkcs10Request{....}]
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
getAllPkcs10RequestSubmissions
Description Gets all pkcs10 requests made by all users
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Authenticated User with this operation privelegies
Arguments
'operation' : 'getAllPkcs10RequestSubmissions'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String
'profile' : profile                                                                                      //String                   
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : {
                         'type' : 'Pkcs10Requests',
                         'Pkcs10Requests' : [Pkcs10Request{'profile':profile,'csr':icsr,'user':user, 'idRequest':
idRequest},Pkcs10Request{....}]
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
aprovePkcs10RequestSubmission
Description Aprove the certificate issuing, made by some user, with the given ID if a decision wasn't made yet
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Authenticated User with this operation privelegies
Arguments
'operation' : 'aprovePkcs10RequestSubmission'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                  
'idRequest' : idRequest                                                                       //String
'profile' : profile                                                                                      //String  
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
denyPkcs10RequestSubmission
Description Deny the pkcs10 request, made by some user, with the given ID if a decision wasn't made yet
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'cancelPkcs10RequestSubmission'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                  
'idRequest' : idRequest                                                                       //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
cancelPkcs10RequestSubmission
Description Deny the pkcs10 request, made by same user, with the given ID if a decision wasn't made yet
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'cancelOwnRevokeCertificateRequest'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                  
'idRequest' : idRequest                                                                       //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
certificateRenewalRequest
Description Create a new certificate from the given csr if the public keys match with the old certificate
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Authenticated User with this operation privelegies
Arguments
'operation' : 'pkcs10Request' 
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String
'pkcs10' :  pkcs10                                                                                    //Base64 Csr String with 
Headers
'profile' : profile                                                                                     //String
'oldCertSN': oldCertificateSerialNumber                                      //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                                     //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'certificate',
                         'certificate' : certificate                                           //Base64 Csr String without 
Headers          
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }}       
certificateRenewalRequestSubmission
Description Save a request for  an certificate renewal Request with the specified profile and user
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'certificateRenewalRequestSubmission'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                                   
'pkcs10' :  pkcs10                                                                                    //Base64CsrString
'profile' : profile                                                                                     //String
'oldCertSN': oldCertificateSerialNumber                                      //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
getcertificateRenewalRequestSubmissions
Description Gets all certificate renewal  requests made by given user
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'getPkcs10RequestSubmissions'                                   
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String 
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : {
                         'type' : 'CertRenewRequests',
                         'CertRenewRequests' : [CertRenewRequest{'profile'=profile,'csr'=csr,'user'=user, 
'idRequest'= idRequest, 'oldCertSn'=oldCertSn},Pkcs10Request{....}]
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }}       
getAllCertificateRenewalRequestSubmissions
Description Gets all certificate renewal requests made by all users
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Authenticated User with this operation privelegies
Arguments
'operation' : 'getAllPkcs10RequestSubmissions'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                  
'profile' : profile                                                                                      //String 
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : {
                         'type' : 'CertRenewRequests',
                         'CertRenewRequests' : [CertRenewRequest{'profile'=profile,'csr'=csr,'user'=user, 
'idRequest'= idRequest, 'oldCertSn'=oldCertSn},Pkcs10Request{....}]
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
aproveCertificateRenewalRequest
Description Aprove the renewal request , made by some user, with the given ID if a decision wasn't made yet
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Authenticated User with this operation privelegies
Arguments
'operation' : 'aproveCertificateRenewalRequest'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                  
'idRequest' : idRequest                                                                       //String
'profile' : profile                                                                                      //String  
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
denyCertificateRenewalRequest
Description Deny the renewal request, made by some user, with the given ID if a decision wasn't made yet
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'cancelCertificateRenewalRequest'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                  
'idRequest' : idRequest                                                                       //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
cancelCertificateRenewalRequest
Description Cancel the renewal request, made by same user, with the given ID if a decision wasn't made yet
Type HTTPS POST
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'cancelOwnCertificateRenewalRequest'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String                  
'idRequest' : idRequest                                                                       //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'ack',
                         'ack' : 'suceeded'                
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
getCertificateFromSerialNumber
Description Retrieve if exist the certificate with the specified serial number
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Any user
Arguments
'operation' : 'getCertificateFromSerialNumber'                  
'certificateSN' : certificateSN                                                                       //String 
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                                     //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'certificate',
                         'certificate' : certificate                                           //Base64 Certificate String without
Headers          
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
getCertificatesFromDN
Description Retrieve if exist the certificates with the specified DN
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Any user
Arguments
'operation' : 'getCertificatesFromDN'                  
'DN' : DN                                                                             //String 
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                                     //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'certificates',
                         'certificate's : [certificate, certificate, ... ]         //List withBase64 Certificate String 
without Headers          
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
getCAChain
Description Retrieve if  specified CA exists his certificate chain
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Any user
Arguments
'operation' : 'getCAChain'                  
'CADN' : CADN                                                                             //String 
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                                     //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'certificates',
                         'certificate's : [certificate, certificate, ... ]         //List withBase64 Certificate String 
without Headers          
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
getCACertificate
Description Retrieve if  specified CA exists his certificate chain
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Any user
Arguments
'operation' : 'getCACertificate'                  
'CADN' : CADN                                                                             //String 
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                                     //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'certificate',
                         'certificate' : certificate                                           //Base64 Certificate String without
Headers          
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
getAvailableProfiles
Description Retrieve a list with all the certificate profile that the user has access to.
Type HTTPS GET
Roles Any authenticated user
Arguments
'operation' : 'getAvailableProfiles'
'user' :  AdministrativeCertificateSerialNumberInDN                 //String 
'sessionID' : sessionToken                                                                   //String
Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'OK',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                                     //timestamp
             'OK' : JSON{
                         'type' : 'certificate',
                         'certificate' : certificate                                           //Base64 Certificate String without
Headers          
         }
}
Error Answer
JSON {
            'status' : 'Exception',                                            
            'timestamp' : timestamp,                                   // timestamp
             'Exception' : JSON{
                             'type' : ErrorType                                //String
                             'code' : ErrorCode                               //String
                             'description' : errorDescription      //String
          }
}       
Appendix B
Client Software Documentation
The functionality currently available through our developed Client software are docu-
mented in this Appendix. The Parameters and their format are here described. The
check the possible API answers it is necessary to see the Appendix API Documenta-
tion. The returned answers are unencapsulated of the first JSON object.
Table B.1: Login operation
Method Name login
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
privateKeyPath
Returns Decapsulated login2 API JSON answer
Table B.2: Logout operation
Method Name logout
Parameters administrativeCertificatePath
Returns Decapsulated logout API JSON answer
Table B.3: Get available profiles operation
Method Name getAvailableProfiles
Parameters administrativeCertificatePath
Returns Decapsulated getAvailableProfiles API JSON answer
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Table B.4: Check certificate validity operation
Method Name checkCertificateValidaty
Parameters CertificatePath
Returns Decapsulated ocspQuery API JSON answer
Table B.5: Check certificate validity operation
Method Name checkCertificateValidaty
Parameters
serialNumber
issuerCA
Returns Decapsulated ocspQuery API JSON answer
Table B.6: Get last CRL operation
Method Name getLastCRL
Parameters
CA
destinyPath
Returns Decapsulated getCrl API JSON answer
Table B.7: Get new certificate operation
Method Name getNewCertificate
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
csrPath
profile
destinyPath
Returns Decapsulated pkcs10Request API JSON answer
Table B.8: Submit a certificate request operation
Method Name submitCertificateRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
csrPath
profile
destinyPath
Returns Decapsulated pkcs10RequestSubmission API JSON answer
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Table B.9: Get pending certificate requests operation
Method Name getPendingCertificateRequests
Parameters administrativeCertificatePath
Returns Decapsulated getPkcs10RequestSubmissions API JSON answer
Table B.10: Get all pending certificate requests operation
Method Name getAllPendingCertificateRequests
Parameters administrativeCertificatePath
Returns Decapsulated getAllPkcs10RequestSubmissions API JSON answer
Table B.11: Approve certificate request operation
Method Name approveCertificateRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
idRequest
Returns Decapsulated aprovePkcs10RequestSubmission API JSON answer
Table B.12: Deny certificate request operation
Method Name denyCertificateRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
idRequest
Returns Decapsulated denyPkcs10RequestSubmission API JSON answer
Table B.13: Cancel certificate request operation
Method Name cancelCertificateRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
idRequest
Returns Decapsulated cancelPkcs10RequestSubmission API JSON answer
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Table B.14: Revoke a certificate operation
Method Name revokeCertificate
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
profile
serialNumber
CA
reason
Returns Decapsulated revokeCertificateRequest API JSON answer
Table B.15: Submit a revoke certificate request operation
Method Name submitCertificateRevokeRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
profile
serialNumber
CA
reason
Returns Decapsulated revokeCertificateRequestSubmission API JSON answer
Table B.16: Get pending revoke certificate requests operation
Method Name getPendingCertificateRevokeRequests
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
csrPath
profile
destinyPath
Returns Decapsulated getRevokeCertificateRequests API JSON answer
Table B.17: Get all pending certificate requests operation
Method Name getAllPendingCertificateRequests
Parameters administrativeCertificatePath
Returns Decapsulated getAllRevokeCertificateRequests API JSON answer
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Table B.18: Approve certificate revoke request operation
Method Name approveCertificateRevokeRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
idRequest
Returns Decapsulated aproveRevokeCertificateRequest API JSON answer
Table B.19: Deny certificate revoke request operation
Method Name denyCertificateRevokeRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
idRequest
Returns Decapsulated denyRevokeCertificateRequest API JSON answer
Table B.20: Cancel certificate revoke request operation
Method Name cancelCertificateRevokeRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
idRequest
Returns Decapsulated cancelRevokeCertificateRequest API JSON answer
Table B.21: Renew certificate operation
Method Name renewCertificate
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
csrPath
profile
destinyPath
Returns Decapsulated certificateRenewalRequest API JSON answer
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Table B.22: Submit a certificate renew request operation
Method Name submitCertificateRenewRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
csrPath
profile
destinyPath
Returns Decapsulated certificateRenewalRequestSubmission API JSON an-
swer
Table B.23: Get pending certificate renew requests operation
Method Name getPendingCertificateRenewRequests
Parameters administrativeCertificatePath
Returns Decapsulated getcertificateRenewalRequestSubmissions API JSON
answer
Table B.24: Get all pending certificate renew requests operation
Method Name getAllPendingCertificateRenewRequests
Parameters administrativeCertificatePath
Returns Decapsulated getAllCertificateRenewalRequestSubmissions API
JSON answer
Table B.25: Approve certificate renew request operation
Method Name approveCertificateRenewRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
idRequest
Returns Decapsulated aproveCertificateRenewalRequest API JSON answer
Table B.26: Deny certificate renew request operation
Method Name denyCertificateRenewRequest
Parameters
administrativeCertificatePath
idRequest
Returns Decapsulated denyCertificateRenewalRequest API JSON answer
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Table B.27: Get certificate with serial number operation
Method Name getCertificateWithSerialNumber
Parameters
serialNumber
destinyPath
Returns Decapsulated getCertificateFromSerialNumber API JSON answer
Table B.28: Get all certificate with DN operation
Method Name getCertificatesWithSubjectDN
Parameters
subjectDN
destinyPath
Returns Decapsulated getCertificatesFromDN API JSON answer
Table B.29: Get certificate chain operation
Method Name getCAChain
Parameters
CASubjectDN
destinyPath
Returns Decapsulated getCAChain API JSON answer
Table B.30: Get CA certificate operation
Method Name getCACertificate
Parameters
CASubjectDN
destinyPath
Returns Decapsulated getCACertificate API JSON answer
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